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Fictitious Commodities: A Theory of
Intellectual Property Inspired by Karl
Polanyi’s “Great Transformation”
Alexander Peukert*
The puzzle this Article addresses is this: how can it be explained
that intellectual property (IP) laws and IP rights (IPRs) have
continuously grown in number and expanded in scope, territorial
reach, and duration, while at the same time have been contested,
much more so than other branches of property law? This Article
offers an explanation for this peculiar dynamic by applying insights
and concepts of Karl Polanyi’s book “The Great Transformation”
to IP. It reconstructs and then applies core Polanyian concepts of
commodification (infra, II), fictitious commodities (infra, III), and
countermovements (infra, IV) to the three main areas of IP, namely
copyrights, patents, and trademarks, as they have evolved and are
currently regulated in international and selected national laws. The
analysis reveals that the history of IP can be told in terms of
Polanyi’s famous “double movement”: efforts to commodify
virtually every reproducible input/output face equally persistent
opposition, which points out the disruption that IPRs inflict upon
communication and competition. Whereas IPRs dis-embed
informational artefacts from the uninterrupted flow of societal
exchange and subject them to prior authorization requirements, IP
countermovements call for their re-embedding, i.e. their usability
irrespective of authorization. From a normative perspective, a
Polanyian perspective on IP suggests that IP law and policy should
ensure that market-based transactions coexist with non-market
modes of accessing and sharing information so that authors,
inventors, and other entrepreneurs have as many options as possible
*
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at hand, and all members of society possess adequate possibilities
to acquire knowledge.
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INTRODUCTION
The puzzle this Article addresses is this: how is it that
intellectual property (IP) laws and IP rights (IPRs) have
continuously grown in number and expanded in scope, territorial
reach, and duration, while at the same time have been contested,
much more so than other branches of property law? Examples of this
cleavage between exclusivity and access interests are manifold.
Reference can be made to 18th century battles between metropolitan
and provincial publishers over copyright,1 to the 19th century free
trade critique of patents,2 to 20th century debates about the adequacy
of IP protection in developing countries,3 and to 21st century
discussions about the relationship between IP and public health4 or
between copyright and access in the digital age.5 During all these
1

BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 9 (1999); RONAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY 221
(2004). Louis d’Héricourt’s memorandum (1725–1726), PRIMARY SOURCES ON
COPYRIGHT, http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord?id=record_
f_1725b [https://perma.cc/6LJD-GVAU] (U.K.) (last visited Oct. 30, 2018). See generally
LUDWIG GIESEKE, VOM PRIVILEG ZUM URHEBERRECHT (1995).
2
CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 68, 203 (1988)
(U.K.); GABRIEL GALVEZ-BEHAR, LA RÉPUBLIQUE DES INVENTEURS 29 (2008) (Fr.). See
generally ERICH SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL PATENTS (1971) (Switz.
& Neth.); MARGRIT SECKELMANN, INDUSTRIALISIERUNG, INTERNATIONALISIERUNG UND
PATENTRECHT IM DEUTSCHEN REICH 1871–1914, at 81–82 (2006).
3
See Alexander Peukert, Intellectual Property and Development—Narratives and their
Empirical Validity, 20 WORLD INTELL. PROP. J. 2 (2017). Cf. Marianne Levin, The
Pendulum Keeps Swinging – Present Discussions on and Around the TRIPS Agreement,
INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS IN A FAIR WORLD TRADE SYS. 3, 5 (Annette Kur & Marianne Levin
eds., 2011) (discussing the continuing debates of IP protection in developing countries).
4
Cf. William W. Fisher III & Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The South Africa AIDS Controversy
– A Case Study in Patent Law and Policy, HARV. L. SCH. (Feb. 10, 2005),
https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/South%20Africa.pdf [https://perma.cc/AB2WVR7H]; World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO
Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2002); Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (with final act, annexes and protocol), concluded at Marrakesh on 15 April
1994, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994), establishing an Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement],
art. 31bis; Panel Report, Australia – Certain Trademark Concerning Trademarks,
Geographical Indications and other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco
Products and Packaging, WT/DS435/R, WT/DS441/R, WT/DS 458/R, WT/DS467/R
(Jun. 28, 2018), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/435_441_458_467r_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/93Q4-J7ME].
5
JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 128 (2001). See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG,
FREE CULTURE (2004); SARA BANNERMAN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND ACCESS TO
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times, the justification of IPRs was called into question. Still, and
irrespective of rigorous and serious critiques, the political and legal
dynamic often resulted in a confirmation of the status quo of IP
protection, if not its further expansion.6
This Article offers an explanation for this peculiar dynamic by
applying insights and concepts of Karl Polanyi’s book “The Great
Transformation” to IP.7 According to the subtitle of this classical
study of economic history, published in 1944, Polanyi’s aim was to
understand the “political and economic origins of our time,” i.e. a
time when WWII was still raging. In a nutshell, he claimed that the
catastrophes of the 20th century can be explained by the rise and fall
of the market economy in the 19th century. To substantiate this
claim, he provides a detailed economic history of how the core
production factors of the industrial age—labor, land, and money—
were transformed into tradeable commodities in the United
Kingdom, and which self-protective measures British society seized
in order to re-embed the “satanic mill” of the autonomous laissez-

KNOWLEDGE (2016); SEBASTIAN HAUNSS, Conflicts in the Knowledge Society (2013);
EDWARD LEE, THE FIGHT FOR THE FUTURE: HOW PEOPLE DEFEATED HOLLYWOOD AND
SAVED THE INTERNET — FOR NOW (2013); COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND
EXCEPTIONS (Ruth L. Okediji ed., 2017).
6
For example, the Association of German Jurists rejected a proposal made by Professor
Ohly to repeal the related rights in simple, non-original photographs (§ 72 German
Copyright Act), and in press publications (§§ 87(f)–(h) German Copyright Act). See
Deutscher Juristentag – Beschlüsse 26, DEUTSCHER JURISTENTAG E.V., (2016)
https://www.djt.de/fileadmin/downloads/70/djt_70_Beschluesse_141202.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LNL2-DST3] (last visited Oct. 30, 2018). The EU legislature likewise
rejected a proposal by the European Commission to reduce the scope of trademark law and
overrule the CJEU to the effect that regarding cases of double identity and well-known
marks only the traditional origin function of trademarks and trademark law ought to be
relevant. Cf. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to
Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks (Recast), COM
(2013) 162 final (Mar. 2, 2013), with Directive 2015/2436, of the European Parliament and
of the Council to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks,
recital 16, 2015 O.J. (L 336) 1, 3 [hereinafter EUTMDir 2015/2436].
7
See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2d ed. 2001). For a general introduction to Polanyi’s writings and
life see, e.g., GARETH DALE, KARL POLANYI – A LIFE ON THE LEFT (2016); GARETH DALE,
RECONSTRUCTING KARL POLANYI (2016).
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faire market into a society in which humans, nature, and economic
exchange can sustainably flourish.8
Irrespective of the validity of Polanyi’s concrete historical
argument, the terminology and concepts employed in the “Great
Transformation” proved to be very fruitful and influential. Among
economic sociologists, for example, “few would disagree with the
statement ‘We are all Polanyians now.’”9 Countless publications in
various fields of the humanities rely on Polanyi’s theories of
commodification, of diametrical countermovements, and of an
economy that is more or less embedded in society at large, and apply
these concepts to all sorts of countries, economies, commodities,
and points in time, in particular to processes of globalization and the
most recent financial crisis.10
Surprisingly, however, IP does not feature prominently among
Polanyians. Polanyi himself did not address the issue, which is
understandable in light of the accessory role that copyrights, patents,
and trademarks played in the analogue, industrial economy in the
middle of the 20th century.11 In a post-industrial economy 4.0,
however, where computerization, digital networks, 3D printing,
robotics, and biotechnology herald a (near)-zero-marginal-cost
society of abundant goods and services, information/knowledge
advances to become the single most important production factor.12
8

See 3 RICHARD THURNWALD, DIE MENSCHLICHE GESELLSCHAFT IN IHREN ETHNOGRUNDLAGEN 44–45 (1932) (explaining embeddedness of economic
spheres in a given society).
9
Jens Beckert, The Great Transformation of Embeddedness: Karl Polanyi and the New
Economic Sociology, in MARKET AND SOCIETY: THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION TODAY 38,
40 (Chris Hann & Keith Hart eds., 2009).
10
See, e.g., FRED BLOCK, THEORY AND SOCIETY 1 (2003); MARKET AND SOCIETY: THE
GREAT TRANSFORMATION TODAY (Chris Hann & Keith Hart eds., 2009); GARETH DALE,
KARL POLANYI: THE LIMITS OF THE MARKET (2010); Sabine Frerichs, Polanyi in an
Hourglass: The Two Lives of a Sociological Classic, in FROM ECONOMY TO SOCIETY?
PERSPECTIVES ON TRANSNATIONAL RISK REGULATION 25 (Bettina Lange et al. eds., 2013);
see also information and references available at KARL POLANYI INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY,
http://www.concordia.ca/research/polanyi.html
[https://perma.cc/3A5NUDHV] (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).
11
ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL
CAPITALISM 14 (1990).
12
For an early account, see PETER DRUCKER, POST-CAPITALIST SOCIETY 5 (1993); see
also JENS BECKERT, GRENZEN DES MARKTES 78 (1997); and lately JEREMY RIFKIN, THE
ZERO MARGINAL COST SOCIETY: THE INTERNET OF THINGS, THE COLLABORATIVE
SOZIOLOGISCHEN
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And, with the significance of information grows the importance of
IPRs. For only if the implementation of ubiquitous copying
machines requires prior authorization and a corresponding payment
of royalties will providers of goods and services be able to charge a
price above marginal costs, which will otherwise approach zero.
Whereas commentators differ in their normative assessment of this
scenario, all agree that the future of market capitalism in the digital
age hinges to a large extent on the question of whether IPRs will be
effectively enforced, further strengthened, or, alternatively, scaled
back or perhaps even abolished.13
In spite of this growing importance of IPRs for current
capitalism, to my knowledge, no comprehensive application of
Polanyian concepts to IP has been undertaken yet. Social scientists
generally do not complement their economic, social, and historical
studies with detailed considerations of the law, although Polanyi
stresses and shows in detail that the market economy in the UK was
established through legal measures.14 The contribution most closely
on point is Bob Jessop’s article, “Knowledge as a fictitious
commodity,” in which Jessop refines Polanyi’s core concept—the
notion of the fictitious commodity—with respect to IP but fails to

COMMONS, AND THE ECLIPSE OF CAPITALISM 4 (2015); PAUL MASON, POSTCAPITALISM: A
GUIDE TO OUR FUTURE 117 (2015); Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 460 (2015).
13
Accordingly, outlooks vary. Some believe more commodification and “global
network capitalism” will follow. See MATTHEW DAVID & DEBORA HALBERT, OWNING THE
WORLD OF IDEAS 94 (2015); Primavera De Filippi & Miguel Said Viera, The
Commodification of Information Commons: The Case of Cloud Computing, 16 COLUM.
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 102 (2014); David Lametti, The Cloud: Boundless Digital Potential
or Enclosure 3.0?, 17 VA. J. L. & TECH. 190 (2012). Some anticipate IPRs will become
“useless” or so reduced in scope and number that the capitalist market will shrink to the
edges of the economy. See RIFKIN, supra note 12, at 6, 218; Lemley, supra note 12, at 460.
Others forecast IPRs will be abolished so that a communist society can be established. See
MASON, supra note 12, at 279–80.
14
See POLANYI, supra note 7, at 91; Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Reading the Story of Law
and Embeddedness Through a Community Lens: A Polanyi-Meets-Cotterrell Economic
Sociology of Law, 62 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 401 (2011). See also KARL POLANYI, GLOBALISATION
AND THE POTENTIAL OF LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL MARKETS (Christian Joerges & Josef Falke
eds., 2011) and the contributions to Special Issue: Towards an Economic Sociology of Law,
40 J.L. & SOC’Y (2013).
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complement this claim with a legal analysis.15 Legal academics, in
turn, talk a lot about commodification and second and third
“enclosure movements” with regard to IP but fail to integrate these
allusions into the much richer theoretical framework that the “Great
Transformation” offers.16 In a recent article on “Property and the
Construction of the Information Economy,” Julie Cohen takes up
this task, but she does not focus on the dynamic evolution of IP as it
stands today. Instead, she tells a more forward-looking story about
the propertization of intangible resources, the dematerialization of
the basic factors of industrial production, and the embedding of
patterns of barter and exchange within information platforms, all of
which contribute to the emergence of what she calls “informational
capitalism.”17
Compared to this agenda, this Article pursues a more modest and
also conventional aim. It reconstructs and then applies core
Polanyian concepts of commodification in Part I, fictitious
commodities in Part II, and countermovements in Part III to the three
main areas of IP, namely copyrights, patents, and trademarks, as
they have evolved and are currently regulated in international, EU,

15
See Bob Jessop, Knowledge as a Fictitious Commodity: Insights and Limits of
Polanyian Analysis, in READING KARL POLANYI FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: MARKET
ECONOMY
AS
A
POLITICAL
PROJECT
115,
http://gerusija.com/downloads/Karl%20Polanyi%20for%20the%2021Century%20Market
%20Economy%20as%20a%20Political%20Project.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4QD4-FJV5]
(Ayşe Buğra & Kaan Ağartan eds., 2007). Jessop’s concepts have been applied by
ELISABETH ABERGEL & CLAIRE LAGIER, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION OF THE GMO
LABELING DEBATE IN THE ERA OF NEW PLANT BREEDING TECHNIQUES (2017).
16
See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 34 (2003); Lametti, supra note 13, at 190; THE
COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel eds.,
2002); Rosemary J. Coombe, Commodity Culture, Private Censorship, Branded
Environments, and Global Trade Politics: Intellectual Property as a Topic of Law and
Society Research, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO L. AND SOC. RES. 369 (Austin Sarat
ed., 2004); Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset:
How International Law is Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L.
557, 560 (2015).
17
Julie E. Cohen, Property and the Construction of the Information Economy: A NeoPolanyian Ontology, in HANDBOOK OF DIGITAL MEDIA AND COMM. (Leah Lievrouw &
Brian Loader eds.), https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2991271 [https://perma.cc/N9JQUFLT] (posted Jun. 26, 2017).

1158

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:1151

and selected national laws.18 The overall purpose of this necessarily
abstract effort is first and foremost a descriptive one, namely to
better understand the exceptional dynamic that characterizes IP law
in comparison to real property law. In the conclusion, I will also
articulate some normative implications. These prescriptive
conclusions will, however, not only be relatively thin, but
moreover—in contrast to Karl Polanyi and most if not all of his
followers—not motivated by a particularly “critical” attitude
towards markets or capitalism in general. To the contrary, I believe
that competitive markets dispose of greater input and output
legitimacy than any other economic system that has been tried in the
past, including crypto-socialist “third ways” and extremist
countermovements.19 This preoccupation with the market does not,
however, in any way diminish the conceptual richness of Karl
Polanyi’s “Great Transformation,” which provides many important
insights into the functioning of the market, its role in modern
society, and the resistance it constantly faces.
I. COMMODIFICATION
The first element of Polanyi’s theory that merits attention is his
powerful explanation of seemingly natural processes in which
practically every resource and human capacity is turned into a
tradeable commodity.

18

See generally Alexander Peukert, Die Expansion des Urheberrechts – eine
polanyische Perspektive, in VOM MAGNETTONBAND ZU SOCIAL MEDIA – FESTSCHRIFT 50
JAHRE URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ (URHG) 305 (Thomas Dreier & Reto Hilty eds., 2015)
(regarding the expansion of German copyright law); see also Alexander Peukert, Vom
Warenzeichen zum Markeneigentum. Ein polanyischer Erklärungsversuch, in
MARKTKOMMUNIKATION ZWISCHEN GEISTIGEM EIGENTUM UND VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ –
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KARL-HEINZ FEZER ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 405 (Wolfgang Büscher et al.
eds., 2016) (regarding the evolution of German and EU trademark law).
19
See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960), https://
iea.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/files/Hayek's%20Constitution%20of%20Liberty
.pdf [https://perma.cc/RMU6-7H5M] (last visited Jan. 30, 2019); Franz Böhm,
Privatrechtsgesellschaft und Marktwirtschaft, 17 JAHRBUCH FÜR DIE ORDNUNG VON
WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT [ORDO] 75 (1966); SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION
AND INCENTIVES 97 (2004); Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual
Property? A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455,
520 (2010); ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5 (2011).
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A. Polanyi on Machines and the Formation of the Market
Economy
Polanyi attributes the initial impulse towards this process to the
invention and implementation of new technologies enabling largescale industrial production. He does not assert that technological
progress constitutes the sole cause of the Great Transformation but
still observes “that[,] once elaborate machines and plant were used
for production in a commercial society, the idea of a self-regulating
market was bound to take shape.”20 The reason for the crucial role
of the move from craftsmen’s tools to machines like the steam
engine is this:
Since elaborate machines are expensive, they do not
pay unless large amounts of goods are produced.
They can be worked without a loss only if the vent of
the goods is reasonably assured and if production
need not be interrupted for want of the primary goods
necessary to feed the machines. For the merchant this
means that all factors involved must be on sale, that
is, they must be available in the needed quantities to
anybody who is prepared to pay for them. Unless this
condition is fulfilled, production with the help of
specialized machines is too risky to be undertaken
both from the point of view of the merchant who
stakes his money and of the community as a whole
which comes to depend upon continuous production
for incomes, employment, and provisions.21
As a consequence,
All transactions are turned into money transactions,
and these in turn require that a medium of exchange
be introduced into every articulation of industrial
life. All incomes must derive from the sale of
something or other, and whatever the actual source

20
21

See POLANYI, supra note 7, at 25.
Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
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of a person’s income, it must be regarded as resulting
from sale.22
In such a self-regulating market system,
there are markets for all elements of industry, not
only for goods (always including services) but also
for labor, land, and money, their prices being called
respectively commodity prices, wages, rent, and
interest. The very terms indicate that prices form
incomes: interest is the price for the use of money
and forms the income of those who are in the position
to provide it; rent is the price for the use of land and
forms the income of those who supply it; wages are
the price for the use of labor power, and form the
income of those who sell it; commodity prices,
finally, contribute to the incomes of those who sell
their entrepreneurial services, the income called
profit being actually the difference between two sets
of prices, the price of the goods produced and their
costs, i.e., the price of the goods necessary to produce
them. If these conditions are fulfilled, all incomes
will derive from sales on the market, and incomes
will be just sufficient to buy all the goods produced.23
This, according to Polanyi, is the essence of what we call the
“market system” and, at the same time the seemingly natural
“satanic mill” of commodification of each and every production
factor.24 It implies “a change in the motive of action on the part of
the members of society: for the motive of subsistence that of gain
must be substituted.”25 In a pure market economy, there is no
alternative to the profit motive if you want to survive.26
This observation seems to imply that commodification and
marketization are quasi-natural phenomena. Social institutions,
including the dominant mode of economic exchange, are, however,
22
23
24
25
26

Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
Id. at 39–40.
See id. at 19.
See id. at 22.
See id. at 24.
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always contingent creations of collective human intentionality.27
Polanyi thus rightly stresses that
[t]here was nothing natural about laissez-faire; free
markets could never have come into being merely by
allowing things to take their course. Just as cotton
manufactures – the leading free trade industry – were
created by the help of protective tariffs, export
bounties, and indirect wage subsidies, laissez-faire
itself was enforced by the state.28
The measures that put the Great Transformation into effect were
legal measures. Polanyi shows in quite some detail the means
through which changes in the law, labor, land, and money as the
major production factors of the industrial age became tradeable
commodities in early 19th century Britain.29 In particular, the British
legislature abolished privileges and laws that prevented the free sale
of labor and land.30 At the core of these legal developments lies the
property issue, which, in Polanyi’s words, “is the legal aspect only
of capitalism”:31 “[w]hile the actual content of property rights might
undergo redefinition at the hands of legislation, assurance of formal
continuity is essential to the functioning of the market system.”32
B. New Technologies and Intellectual Property
To support my assertion that Polanyi’s theory of
commodification is informative for IP, it will be necessary to show
that certain complex machines triggered a demand for property
rights in inventions, works, and other subject matter of today’s IP
system. On a general level, it is indeed widely acknowledged that IP
law can be conceived of as a reaction to technological change or,

27

See PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966); JOHN R. SEARLE, THE
CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 114 (1995); RAIMO TUOMELA, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
SOCIALITY: THE SHARED POINT OF VIEW (2007).
28
POLANYI, supra note 7, at 80.
29
See DALE, supra note 10, at 208.
30
See POLANYI, supra note 7, at 79.
31
See id. at 99.
32
See id. at 134.
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more precisely, the development of reproduction technologies.33 To
further disentangle the complex relationship between technology,
the market, and IP law, it is useful to distinguish the initial
propertization of information by the first modern IP laws in history
(1) from later expansions of this body of law (2).34
1. Printing and Other New Technologies in Early Modern
Times
The “elaborate” and expensive machines that triggered the move
towards property rights in abstract IP objects were wind mills,
drainage systems for mining, and, last but not least, the printing
press.35 The former technologies were key for the reclamation of
land, agricultural production, and the exploitation of silver and other
valuable metal at a scale never achieved before in Europe.36 The
latter technology of mass communication eventually transformed
stratified feudal/absolutist script societies into functionally
differentiated modern societies.37 Since the invention, improvement,
and employment of all those machines required significant
investments, Polanyi’s theory suggests that the respective providers,
at one point in time, demanded exclusive property rights in order to
be able to generate income based on sales.
At first sight, history seems to cast doubt on this hypothesis.
Both the invention and proliferation of the mentioned technologies
33

See Martin Kretschmer, Copyright and its Discontents, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE
CREATIVE AND CULTURAL INDUSTRIES 456 (Candace Jones et al. eds., 2015) (“a purely
technological reflex appeared to drive the evolution of copyright law”); COPYRIGHT AND
THE CHALLENGE OF THE NEW (Brad Sherman & Leanne Wiseman eds., 2012); HERBERT
ZECH, INFORMATION ALS SCHUTZGEGENSTAND 167 (2012).
34
Cf. Katarzyna Gracz, Opposing the Expansion of Copyright Law: Social Norms in the
Quest against ACTA and the “Commodification of Knowledge and Culture Project,” in
EXPANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: COPYRIGHTS AND PATENTS IN THE 20TH CENTURY
EUROPE AND BEYOND 267 (Hannes Siegrist & Augusta Dimou eds., 2017).
35
See ALEXANDER PEUKERT, KRITIK DER ONTOLOGIE DES IMMATERIALGÜTERRECHTS 74
(2018).
36
RIFKIN, supra note 12, at 39; Christopher May, The Venetian Moment: New
Technologies, Legal Innovation and the Institutional Origins of Intellectual Property, 20
PROMETHEUS 159 (2002).
37
See ELIZABETH L. EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING REVOLUTION IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE
(2012); WALTER J. ONG, ORALITY AND LITERACY 129 (2012) (“Typography had made the
word into a commodity.”); MARSHALL MCLUHAN, GUTENBERG GALAXY: THE MAKING OF
THE TYPOGRAPHIC MAN 142 (1962).
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as well as the earliest laws concerning the use of new machines
(Venice 1477, England 1624) and the printing of books (UK 1710)
predate the formation of the market economy, which Polanyi dates
to the first half of the 19th century, by decades, even centuries.38 It
thus appears that the relationship between technological progress
and propertization is much less straightforward than Polanyi
presumed, if it exists at all.
Polanyi is, however, clear about the fact that the Great
Transformation was the result of a very long line of events predating
the paradigm shift of the 19th century. He notes, for example, that
the “[c]ottage industry was spreading by the second half of the
fifteenth century” and that, “[f]rom the sixteenth century onwards[,]
markets were both numerous and important. Under the mercantile
system they became, in effect, a main concern of government. . . .”39
Nevertheless, during all those centuries, “there was still no sign
of the coming control of markets over human society. On the
contrary. Regulation and regimentation were stricter than ever; the
very idea of a self-regulating market was absent.”40 This observation
also proves true for the area of interest here. Wind mills, mining
technologies, and the printing press were not immediately regulated
by freely transferable property rights but for a long time by
privileges. The privilege was the regulatory instrument that allowed
absolutist rulers to incentivize and protect private initiative and
investment but at the same time retain control over the use of new,
powerful technologies. Privileges were granted on a case-by-case
basis to loyal subjects or immigrants and employed as a tool of
mercantilist control and censorship. Through the privilege, the
printing press and other elaborate machines were integrated into a
strictly controlled economy, which in turn was embedded in a
stratified feudal society.
The 1477 statute of Venice, the 1624 Statute of Monopolies, and
the 1710 Statute of Anne are doubtlessly important steps in the
movement from privilege to property and thus from an embedded
mercantilist economy to a self-regulating capitalist market. Legal
38
39
40

See POLANYI, supra note 7, at 19.
See id. at 19, 32.
Id. at 58; DALE, supra note 10, at 80.
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historians point out, however, that these statutes were still firmly
grounded in the early modern privilege system, most notably
because they do not grant property rights in abstract, intangible
“inventions” or “works.” Instead, they regulate who is entitled to
make “new manufacture” or “print books.”41
The transformation of these activities and artefacts into
commodified abstract works, inventions, and other IP only occurred
in the late 18th and early 19th century. Before this point of time, the
notion of abstract IP objects—“the” work, “the” invention, etc.—
was either “unthinkable”42 or considered a “wild” proposition.43 The
political, economic, and conceptual difficulties of the move from
privileges to act in a stratified society to individual intellectual
property rights exchangeable on an anonymous market can be
observed, for example, in the long and fiercely fought battles of the
booksellers in 18th century Britain, France, and Germany.44 The
more efficient printing and re-printing technologies became and the
more market transactions replaced feudal systems of patronage and
privilege, the more it became evident that publishers, authors, and
inventors require some kind of property right that enables them to
recoup their sunk investments in the first prototype, e.g. a
manuscript of a book. Using the example of the German printing
industry, this shift can even be pinpointed to a particular year and
event, namely to 1764, when the then leading Leipzig publishers
switched from a barter trade in books to the sale of their production.
As a consequence of this business decision, the complete German
book sector had to be restructured to the effect that all exchanges
41
Regarding patent law, see MACLEOD, supra note 2, at 80, 203; Oren Bracha, Owning
Ideas: A History of Anglo-American Intell. Prop., UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
SCHOOL OF LAW 530 (June 2005), https://law.utexas.edu/faculty/obracha/dissertation/
[https://perma.cc/96K8-4VR6]. Regarding copyright law, see SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra
note 1, at 17; Friedemann Kawohl & Martin Kretschmer, Abstraction and Registration:
Conceptual Innovations and Supply Effects in Prussian and British Copyright (1820–50),
2 INTELL. PROP. QUARTERLY 209, 212 (2003) (“Eighteenth century copyright was practised
as the sale of a manuscript from author to publisher against a one-off fee, and litigation
between competing publishers.”); DEAZLEY, supra note 1, at 221; Anne Barron, Copyright
Law’s Musical Work, 15 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 101, 106 (2006).
42
Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 1600–1836: How Patents Became
Rights and why we Should Care, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 177, 219 (2004).
43
Millar v. Taylor, [1769] 4 Burrow 2303, 2357 (Yates, J.).
44
See PEUKERT, supra note 35.

2019]

FICTITIOUS COMMODITIES

1165

became money exchanges, including the contract between the
author and the publisher regarding a particular “work” that was then
produced and distributed in a certain number of “copies.”45
The French revolutionary patent and copyright acts of
1791/1793 present the first full legal implementation of the new
paradigm and at the same time the conceptual point of no return.46
From here, the idea that authors and inventors own
intangible/intellectual goods and sell them on the market spread
around the globe.47 During the course of their still solidifying
commodification, the evaluation of works and inventions became
more and more detached from arguments of traditional aesthetics
and public benefits. In the end, the only relevant value remaining
was the market-conception of value: every use value, however
motivated or characterized, has to translate into an exchange value.
Thus, what is worth copying is worth protecting by tradeable
property rights.48
2. Later Technological Development
Once the market is established as the dominant mode of
economic exchange, it tends to absorb every new technology. All
input into a new technology—in particular the sunk costs into
research and development—and all of its output have to be up for
sale because there is, in general, no other way to recoup investments
and generate income.49
45

HELMUTH KIESEL & PAUL MÜNCH, GESELLSCHAFT UND LITERATUR IM 18.
JAHRHUNDERT 124 (1977).
46
HEINRICH BOSSE, AUTORSCHAFT IST WERKHERRSCHAFT 100, 107 (2014) [1981].
47
Alexander Peukert, Intellectual Property: The Global Spread of Legal Concept 1,
KRITIKA: ESSAYS ON INTELL. PROP. 114 (Peter Drahos et al. eds., 2015).
48
Regarding inventions see Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817);
Bracha, supra note 42, at 233. Regarding works of art, see Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252 (1903) (“Yet if they command the interest of any
public, they have a commercial value—it would be bold to say that they have not an
aesthetic and educational value—and the taste of any public is not to be treated with
contempt.”); Barton Beebe, Bleistein, the Problem of Aesthetic Progress, and the Making
of American Copyright Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (2017). Regarding trademarks, see
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in Pepsi
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 400–12 (1990). Critique: ALEXANDER PEUKERT,
GÜTERZUORDNUNG ALS RECHTSPRINZIP 733–90 (2008).
49
See DAN SCHILLER, HOW TO THINK ABOUT INFORMATION 21 (2010).
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The history of IP from the 19th to the 21st century is replete with
examples of this Polanyian logic of commodification: musical
compositions attained the status of objects of property only after the
mass production of sheet music created the impression that music is
more akin to written texts than to ephemeral performances on
stage.50 The thingification of paintings, sculptures, and other works
of fine art took even longer. It was not until industrial remakes of
three- and two-dimensional products flooded the market in the late
19th century that these artefacts were also idealized as abstract
industrial designs or works of (applied) art and allocated to their first
producers.51 In Germany, this was also the time when large research
laboratories, for example, in the chemical industry, were
established, giving rise to claims for efficient patent protection for
the inventions ensuing from these organizations.52 Technologies of
fixing and reproducing sounds and (moving) images triggered
several 20th century copyrights and related rights in audio
performances, phonograms, photographs, films, and broadcasting
signals, all of which cost money to produce but are easily
reproduced without payment.53 Computerization and digitization
generalized and amplified this phenomenon, leading to extended
exclusive rights in all existing copyright subject matter and to new
subject matter such as computer programs, databases, and press
publications.54 New IP rights in layout designs (topographies) of
integrated circuits and the application of patent law to computer50

See Bach v. Longman (1777), in PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT, http://
www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/pdf/uk_1777_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ATU-QK82] (last
visited Oct. 30, 2018); Friedemann Kawohl & Martin Kretschmer, Abstraction &
Registration: Conceptual Innovations and Supply Effects in Prussian and British
Copyright (1820–50), 2 INTELL. PROP. Q. 209, 214 (2003) https://
core.ac.uk/download/pdf/76740.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FLN-5GFG]; Anne Barron,
Copyright Law’s Musical Work, 15 SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES 101, 119 (2006).
51
See STINA TEILMANN-LOCK, THE OBJECT OF COPYRIGHT 120–21 (2017).
52
See SECKELMANN, supra note 2, at 405.
53
See PEUKERT, supra note 35; Sherman & Wiseman, supra note 33; JONATHAN STERNE,
THE AUDIBLE PAST 23 (2003); BERNARD EDELMAN, OWNERSHIP OF THE IMAGE (1979);
Anne Barron, The Legal Properties of Film, 67 MOD. L. REV. 177, 181 (2004); William
Cornish, Conserving Culture and Copyright: A Partial History, 13 EDINBURGH L. REV. 8
(2009).
54
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 10; GESETZ ÜBER URHEBERRECHT UND
VERWANDTE SCHUTZRECHTE [URHG] [GERMAN COPYRIGHT ACT], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBL I at
1273, last amended by Gesetz [G], Sept. 1, 2017, BGBL. I at 3346, art. 1, §§ 87f-h.
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implemented and biotechnological inventions can also be explained
as measures to integrate these technologies into the capitalist market
economy.55
In contrast to patents, copyrights, and other IP rights in
innovations, trademarks do not attach to and thus commodify new
technologies. Instead, trademark law grants exclusive rights in the
use of distinctive signs in the course of trade, irrespective of whether
that trade concerns new or traditional types of goods and services.56
The history of trademark law is nonetheless also closely tied to
technological progress and innovative marketing practices resulting
therefrom. Before industrialization, goods and services were
primarily distinguished and identified by their characteristics and/or
their place of production.57 If fanciful signs were attached to
products, their use was strictly regulated by guilds and other
organizations embedded in a stratified society.58 With the
emergence of the competitive market, this economic order lost its
significance. Early industrialists employed new signs indicating
their name or their location (e.g. Worchester Sauce). Though disembedded from medieval practices, these signs retained an
accessory role. Their purpose was to support the sale of a product
that constituted the primary commodity. They had not yet acquired
the status of a separate commodity.59

55

See generally WIPO, Treaty on Intell. Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits,
I.L.M. 1477 (1989); Nari Lee, Patent Eligible of Business Subject Matter Reconfiguration
and the Emergence of Proprietarian Norms – The Patent Eligibility of Business Methods,
45 IDEA 321, 321 (2005); Jessica C. Lai, A Tale of Two Histories: The ‘Invention’ and Its
Incentive Theory, in INTELL.PROP.AND ACCESS TO IMMATERIAL GOODS 94, 119 (Jessica C.
Lai & Antoinette Maget Dominicé eds., 2016); Mario Biagioli, Between Knowledge And
Technology: Patenting Methods, Rethinking Materiality, 22 ANTHROPOLOGICAL F. 285,
289–90 (2012).
56
See Cohen, supra note 17, at 5–6.
57
See Gary Richardson, Brand Names before the Industrial Revolution (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1390, 2008), http://www.nber.org/papers/w13930.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5MGF-UXND].
58
KARL-HEINZ FEZER, MARKENRECHT, Einleitung in das deutsche, europäische und
internationale Marken- und Kennzeichenrecht, para. 17 (4th ed. 2009).
59
See Paul Duguid, Early Marks: American Trademarks Before US Trademark Law,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00076791.2016.1246541 [https://perma.cc/5JFT-3FAC] (2016)
(last visited Oct. 30, 2018).
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This abstraction only occurred in reaction to further changes in
production and marketing, both again related to technological
development. In the late 19th century, consumer goods started to be
produced at massive industrial scales. They were shipped to
institutional dealers and sold to consumers at places far away from
the production site. In order to allow consumers to distinguish and
remember goods under conditions of such anonymous production
and consumption, entrepreneurs like Karl August Lingner from
Dresden invented fanciful brand names (“Warenzeichen”) such as
“Odol,” which identified the product, not a particular producer or
place of production.60 Already in the early 20th century, the creation
of such a brand image was considered a costly input into capitalist
production that merited protection against free-riders, even absent a
risk of confusion on the part of the consumer.61 But only after further
technological advancements had allowed capitalist societies to
proceed to an affluent society where “wants are increasingly created
by the process by which they are satisfied”62 did trademarks become
valuable commodities in and of themselves. Under these conditions,
both producers and consumers require trademarks in order to create
and satisfy demand for conspicuous consumption and reputational
distinction.63 The input into the creation of these abstract signifiers,
60
See Lionel A. F. Bently, From Communication to Thing: Historical Aspects of the
Conceptualization of Trademarks as Property, 1 TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
L. 118, 149 (2014) (U.K.); KAI-UWE HELLMANN, SOZIOLOGIE DER MARKE 46 (2003); Ross
D. Petty, The Codevelopment of Trademark Law and the Concept of Brand Marketing in
the United States Before 1946, 31 J. MACROMARKETING 85 (2011).
61
Landgericht Elberfeld [LG] [regional court] Sept. 11, 1924, 1924 GEWERBLICHER
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 204 (204–205); Hermann Isay, Die
Selbstständigkeit des Rechts der Marke, 1929 GRUR 23, 25; Frank I. Schechter, The
Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 813 (1927); Barton Beebe,
The Suppressed Misappropriation Origins of Trademark Antidilution Law: The
Landgericht Elberfeld’s Odol Opinion and Frank Schechter’s The Rational Basis of
Trademark Protection, in INTELL. PROP. AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP
(Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2013).
62
See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 131–37 (1958).
63
See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 84 (1994) [1899] (“The
basis on which good repute in any highly organised industrial community ultimately rests
is pecuniary strength; and the means of showing pecuniary strength, and so of gaining or
retaining a good name, are leisure and a conspicuous consumption of goods.”); PETER
CORRIGAN, THE SOCIOLOGY OF CONSUMPTION 179 (1997) (“Instead of consuming the
goods themselves, we consume the meanings of goods as constructed through advertising
and display . . .”).
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in particular for luxury brands, is commodified through
contemporary trademark law, for example, via the functionality
doctrine of the CJEU and the doctrine of post-sale confusion.64
Hardly ever has this continuous commodification and expansion
of IP law been straightforwardly justified by the need to subject each
and every factor of supply and demand in a market economy to the
laws of the market, i.e. to tradeable property rights. The systemic
role of IPRs is touched upon, however, in the CJEU’s definition of
the “specific subject-matter” of IPRs, which justifies a restriction of
fundamental freedoms in the Internal Market. According to this
definition, IPRs are “intended in particular to ensure for the right
holders concerned protection of the right to exploit commercially the
marketing or the making available of the protected subject-matter,
by the grant of licenses in return for payment of remuneration.”65
With this complicated definition, the CJEU indeed gets to the
essence of IP, the purpose of which is to establish an authorization
requirement that the right holder can exchange for money. In a
market economy, every input for which there is a demand – even if
it is a signifier devoid of meaning – ought to be on sale. And the
purpose of IPRs is just this: propertization for the sake of
marketization.
The systemic role of IPRs in a market economy with ubiquitous
reproduction technologies is also brought to light in IP laws that
leave their scope of application effectively open. Under EU and
German law, this is the case for the notion of a copyrightable work
and the scope of exclusive exploitation rights in these works, the
64
See AIPPI, Q68, Economic significance, functions and purpose of the trademark,
Yearbook 1979/I, 463–465; ECJ Case C-487/07, L’Oréal v. Bellure, 2009 E.C.R. I-5185,
paras. 49, 58; Dev Saif Gangjee, Property in Brands, in PROP. CONCEPTS IN INTELL. PROP.
L.
(Helena
R.
Howe
&
Jonathan
Griffiths
eds.,
2013),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2249765 [https://perma.cc/VR3QR65M].
65
See CJEU Joined Cases C-403/08 & C-429/08, Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd.
and Others v. QC Leisure and Others, Karen Murphy v. Media Protection Services Ltd.,
2011 E.C.R. I-09083 para. 107 (emphasis added). See also Panel Report, United States –
Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, 44–50, WT/DS/160/R (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter
Section 110(5) Panel Report]. (“These exclusive rights are the legal means by which
exploitation of the work, i.e., the commercial activity for extracting economic value from
the rights to the work, can be carried out.”).
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fields of technology covered by patent law, and the type of signs of
which a trademark may consist.66 The comprehensive and flexible
scope of IP laws and rights makes sure that new technological
possibilities to invent, create, and commercialize artefacts will
automatically be subject to the central legal feature of the market:
exclusive property rights.
Comprehensive propertization furthermore conforms to the
interests of all market participants who have to be able to exchange
every productive input and output for money in order to make a
living. The input/output at stake in IP is the always costly production
of a first, but easily reproduced, prototype of an invention, of a work,
and of a brand image. Only if these reproducible “Master Artefacts”
are recognized as tradeable commodities can their producers
generate a market-based income.67 Accordingly, IP laws allocate
IPRs to those who carry the entrepreneurial responsibility for these
creative or non-creative products, namely to independent authors,
inventors, designers, or their employers, to phonogram and film
producers, to broadcasters, to producers of databases, and to the
(legal) person who has applied for a trademark registration or who
controls the use of a distinctive sign in the course of trade.68 Their
privileged position vis-à-vis the world is not justified because of a
particular personal relationship between them and their work
product. Only scant subject matter of today’s IP can legitimately be
said to bear the personal stamp of its creator. Instead, IPRs are
justified from an individual right-holder’s perspective because it
would be unjust to subject all these providers of new reproducible
66
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 27(1) (regarding patent law); Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 641–43 (2010) (regarding the limits under U.S. patent law);
EUTMDir 2015/2436, supra note 6, art. 3, 2015 O.J. (L 336) 1, 7 (regarding the limits
under trademark law); GERMAN COPYRIGHT ACT §§ 2, 15 (regarding the limits under
copyright law).
67
PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 21 (1996); Jessop, supra
note 15, at 121.
68
Cf. Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention) art.
60, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 268 [hereinafter EPC]; Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works art. 2(6), Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne
Convention]; Council Regulation 6/2002 on Community designs, art. 14, 2002 O.J. (L 3)
1, 6 (EU) [hereinafter Community Design Regulation]; Regulation 2017/1001, of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade
mark, art. 3, 2017 O.J. (L 154) 1, 7.
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artefacts to the unforgiving laws of the market but at the same time
to withhold from them the legal tool they need in order to generate
income and profit from their efforts. From John Stuart Mill to PierreJoseph Proudhon, market theorists and critics agree that “it would
be a gross immorality in the law to set everybody free to use a
person’s work without his consent, and without giving him an
equivalent.”69 Taken to their extremes, the systemic and
individualistic arguments for IPRs justify the establishment of IP
markets for every tiny fragment of information and for every act of
copying.70
In an already established market economy, further factors
amplify this logic of commodification. If one technology of
reproduction replaces an already commodified one, courts justify
the expansion of IPRs to the new technology by pointing out that
other possibilities for market exchanges and individual incomes
might “erode.”71 On an international scale, knowledge-exporting

69

See Borghi, supra note 15, at 15–16 for further references. inter alia to 5 JOHN STUART
MILL, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, ch. 10, no. 4 (1848). In this sense on the
fundamental right to property, see Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal
Constitutional Court] July 7, 1971, 31 BVERFGE 229 (240–41) – Kirchen- und
Schulgebrauch; see also Reichsgericht [RG] [Federal Court of Justice until 1945] Apr. 7,
1910, 73 RGZ 294 (297) (phonogram producer); Rudolf Callmann, Sittenwidrige
Ausbeutung fremder Arbeit, 1928 GRUR 251, 254; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal
Court of Justice] May 31, 1960, 1960 GRUR 619 (624) – Künstlerlizenz (principle of
equivalence of work and reward); BGH May 31, 1960, 1960 GRUR 614 (616) – Figaros
Hochzeit (it is fair that authors and performers share the income generated from a public
communication of a recording because both have contributed to its production); BGH Dec.
10, 1987, 1988 GRUR 308 (310) – Informationsdienst (database producer). See generally
RG Nov. 14, 1936, 153 RGZ 1 (22) with further references (with justification for the
continued force of this argument during Nazism).
70
See BGH Oct. 25, 2012, 115 GRUR 717 para. 26, 41 – Covermount (grant of rights
irrespective of the accruing exchange value); regarding sound samples and other digital
fragments see Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 792. (2005); but
see VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (2016). See generally BGH June 1, 2017,
61 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT [ZUM] 760 (762) para. 18 – Metall auf
Metall III (even the smallest excerpts are protected); BVerfG May 31, 2016, 69 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2247 para. 91. – Metall auf Metall.
71
See, e.g. RG Jan. 31, 1891, 27 RGZ 60 (66) – Clariophon (clariophones equal sheet
music copies); BGH Feb. 27, 1962, 1962 GRUR 470 (473)– AKI (television to be treated
like other film exploitation); BGH Nov. 11, 1953, 1954 GRUR 216 (219-20) – RomFassung (public communication of recordings); BGH May 18, 1955, 1955 GRUR 492
(497, 499) – Grundig-Reporter (private copy machines); Am. Broad. Companies, Inc. v.
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countries have successfully persuaded and pressured other countries
into some form of IP protection, inter alia with the argument that it
would be unfair to establish a world market for all types of products,
but not for IP.72 Finally, commodification via IPRs creates new
assets that are traded on financial markets that in turn exhibit their
own demand for ever more tradeable IP commodities/securities.73
C. Consequence: IP as an End in Itself
The pervasive systemic and individualistic plea for property in a
market economy creates the impression that commodification is an
unavoidable natural process: there is no alternative.74 Exclusive
exploitation based on IPRs is “normal,” and lawful access without
prior authorization the exception.75 In the area of IP, this “property
logic”76 led to a self-referential closure of the IP system, where IPRs
are no longer considered a tool to achieve an end, for example, to
promote the progress of science and useful arts77 or to enable
Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506 (2014) (cloud video provider similar to cable TV
stations); EDELMAN, supra note 53, 35 (photographs equal other copying techniques).
72
On the spread of IP law among European states and the U.S., see SAM RICKETSON,
THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROT. OF INDUS. PROP. § 2.13 (2015); SECKELMANN, supra
note 2, at 156 (US companies demanding patent protection at world exhibitions in Europe
in the 1870’s); Paul Duguid, French Connections: The International Propagation of
Trademarks in the Nineteenth Century, 10 ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y 3 (2009) (France as a first
mover and exporter of trademark law). On the globalization of IP via colonialism, see
Alexander Peukert, The Colonial Legacy of the International Copyright System, in
COPYRIGHT AFRICA. HOW INTELL. PROP., MEDIA AND MARKETS TRANSFORM CULTURAL
GOODS 37 (Ute Röschenthaler & Mamadou Diawara eds., 2015). On the globalization of
IP after the fall of the Soviet Union, see SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE
GLOBALIZATION OF INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS (2003).
73
Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How
International Law is Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 557,
566 (2015).
74
See supra notes 20–32 and accompanying text.
75
See Berne Convention, supra note 68, art. 9(2); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts.
13, 17, 26(2), 30; WIPO: Copyright Treaty (WCT) art. 10(1), Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65;
WIPO: Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), art. 16(2), Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M.
76 [hereinafter WPPT]; Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, art. 13(2), June 24,
2012 [hereinafter BTAP]. See generally Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 65, at 44–
50; Christophe Geiger et al., The Three-Step-Test Revisited: How to Use the Test’s
Flexibility in National Copyright Law, 29 AM. U. INT’L 581 (2014).
76
See Thomas Dreier, Primär- und Folgemärkte, in GEISTIGES EIGENTUM IM DIENST DER
INNOVATION 51, 76. (Gerhard Schricker et al. eds., 2001).
77
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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economies to benefit from their comparative advantage in producing
information.78 Instead, they are perceived as principally beneficial
ends in themselves.79 Thus, the more protection there is, the better.80
The results of this ideology can be observed, for example, in EU
IP law. Directives proclaim that a “high level of protection” will
promote innovation and creativity, improve competitiveness, and
develop employment.81 The CJEU relies on this aim of establishing
a high level of protection for an extensive interpretation of the
acquis.82 The court also uses the three-step test to rule out any
practice that “reduc[es] the volume of sales or of other lawful
transactions” and thus adversely affects “normal exploitation.”83
Since 2009, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights provides
additional support for this logic by apodictically proclaiming that
“Intellectual property shall be protected.” Why?: “[b]ecause of its
growing importance and Community secondary legislation.”84

78

See generally Keith E. Maskus, Incorporating a Globalized Intellectual Property
Rights Regime Into an Economic Development Strategy, in INTELL. PROP., GROWTH AND
TRADE 497 (Keith E. Maskus ed., 2008).
79
See Alexander Peukert, Intellectual Property as an End in Itself, 33 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 67, 67–71 (2011).
80
See Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one
part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part art. 131(2),
Oct. 30, 2008, 2008 O.J. (L 289) 3 (the CARIFORUM States and the EU “recognise that
the protection and enforcement of intellectual property plays a key role in fostering
creativity, innovation and competitiveness, and are determined to ensure increasing levels
of protection appropriate to their levels of development”) (emphasis added).
81
Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, recital 4, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 1; Parliament
and Council Directive 2004/48, recitals 1, 10, 2004 O.J. (L 157) 45.
82
See, e.g., CJEU Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo, ECLI:EU:C:2017:456, para.
22.
83
See CJEU Case C-435/12, ACI Adam v. Stichting de Thuiskopie,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:254, paras. 38–39.
84
See Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, CHARTE 4473/00
CONVENT 49, Note from the Praesidium – Text of the explanations relating to the
complete text of the Charter, 19–20, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (Oct.
11, 2000), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/04473_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/
GGF5-NXDP]; Christophe Geiger, Intellectual Property Shall be Protected!? Article 17
(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: a Mysterious Provision
with an Unclear Scope, 31 EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 113 (2009).
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II. THE FICTITIOUSNESS OF IP
The IP commodification story has been told many times.85 At
first sight, equally trivial as this story is the observation that
commodification is a contingent process. Things could have evolved
differently. But even this obvious truth is, according to Polanyi,
overshadowed by an “economistic fallacy” that “equate[s] the
human economy with its market form.”86 In other words, the market
has often been conceived of as the only available form of regulating
the relationship between scarce resources and human wants, i.e. the
economy. Polanyians stress that this reductionist economic
determinism is flawed.87
More interesting and productive than the insistence on
contingency and thus politics in economic matters is, in my view,
another concept contained in the “Great Transformation”: the notion
of the “fictitious commodity.” The study of land, labor, and money
as “fictitious commodities” constitutes the core of Polanyi’s theory
because it links commodification processes (supra, II) and
countermovements (infra, IV) together to form Polanyi’s famous
“double movement.” This section addresses the question of whether
and in what sense the tradeable good “IP” constitutes a fiction.88
A. Polanyi on Fictitious Commodities
In contrast to Karl Marx’s critique of commodity fetishism,
Polanyi does not consider invariably every tradeable good or service
as an obscured power relation.89 Instead, he distinguishes “real”
commodities from “fictitious” commodities. The first are defined as
goods or services that are actively and originally “produced for
sale,” whereas a fictitious commodity is exchanged for money but
was not actively and purposefully created to this end:
85
For a Marxist reading of the IP expansion see EDELMAN, supra note 53; Ugo Pagano,
The Crisis of Intellectual Monopoly Capitalism, 38 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 1409 (2014);
Coombe, supra note 16, at 369.
86
See KARL POLANYI, THE LIVELIHOOD OF MAN 20 (Harry W. Pearson ed., 1977).
87
See Claus Thomasberger, The Belief in Economic Determinism, Neoliberalism, and
the Significance of Polanyi’s Contribution in the Twenty-First Century, 41 INT’L J. POL.
ECON. 16 (2012).
88
For a conceptual analysis, see Jessop, supra note 15, at 115.
89
On parallels and differences between Marx and Karl Polanyi, see DALE, supra note
10, at 241.
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The crucial point is this: labor, land, and money are
essential elements of industry; they also must be
organized in markets; in fact, these markets form an
absolutely vital part of the economic system. But
labor, land, and money are obviously not
commodities; the postulate that anything that is
bought and sold must have been produced for sale is
emphatically untrue in regard to them. In other
words, according to the empirical definition of a
commodity they are not commodities. Labor is only
another name for a human activity which goes with
life itself, which in its turn is not produced for sale
but for entirely different reasons, nor can that activity
be detached from the rest of life, be stored or
mobilized; land is only another name for nature,
which is not produced by man; actual money, finally,
is merely a token of purchasing power which, as a
rule, is not produced at all, but comes into being
through the mechanism of banking or state finance.
None of them is produced for sale. The commodity
description of labor, land, and money is entirely
fictitious.90
In other words, land, labor, and money are treated as if they had
been produced for sale, although they were either not produced at
all (like land) or, if so, were not for sale (like labor).91 In contrast to
traditionally marketed artefacts like food, machines, or books, the
natural environment (land) and human capabilities (labor) as such
are not created in a profit-oriented production process subject to the
competitive pressures of market forces. Instead, they are given or
are the result of a personal and societal endeavor. The
transformation these resources underwent in 19th century England
in order to be exchangeable for money is the “Great
90

POLANYI, supra note 7, at 71 (emphasis in original).
See id. at 10. The fictitiousness of money is of another kind, which will not be further
elaborated in this article. It concerns the contradiction between, on the one hand, money as
a societal-institutional fact, and its strict representation in gold and other brute facts, on the
other. Cf. Simon Derpmann, Geld als Ware, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MARKET 227, 244
(Hans-Christoph Schmidt am Busch ed., 2016).
91
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Transformation” that Polanyi studies and pejoratively labels
“fictitious.”92
B. IP: A Fiction in What Sense?
It is not uncommon among legal theorists and historians to claim
that IP is a “fiction.”93 Such observations are relevant for our
purposes because they do not relate to IP rights or laws—with
property in the legal sense94—but to the subject matter of exclusive
rights, e.g. “the” work, “the” invention, design, sign, etc. (i.e. with
property in the sense of a good or resource that is owned by
someone). What Polanyi and the referenced IP theorists thus share
is an interest in the ontological status of certain resources in a market
economy. It is, however, not clear whether Polanyi and
contemporary IP theorists also apply the same definition of
fictitiousness. As explained, fictitiousness in Polanyian terms means
that an element of the market economy is not produced for sale but,
due to a great, “fictitious” transformation, is nevertheless up for sale.
If one applies this distinction to the subject matter of IP laws and
IPRs, three transformations (“fictions”) come to the fore.
1. Information Not Produced for Sale
The first transformation concerns IP subject matter that was
originally not produced for sale but created for other purposes.
This classical Polanyian category must not be confused with the
always “fictitious” commodification of intellectual or
entrepreneurial labor sold on labor markets and remunerated by
wages. For, in general, the individual labor or “knowledge”
92

See Jessop, supra note 15, at 119.
See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ESSENTIAL FOUCAULT 377, 382 (Paul Rabinow &
Nikolas Rose eds., 2003) (“fiction of the work”); JAMES E. PENNER, IDEA OF PROPERTY 118
(1992) (“idiotic fiction that intellectual property constitutes property in ideas (patents) or
expressions”; “in general it does no harm to speak of rights in ideas, or in manuscripts, or
in marks, any more than it does to refer to one’s rights in one’s labour.”); DRAHOS, supra
note 67, at 67, 151–56, 211; Hugh Breakey, Properties of Copyright, in CONCEPTS OF
PROPERTY 137, 152 (Helena R. Howe & Jonathan Griffiths eds., 2013); Robert H. Rotstein,
Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the Work, 68 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 725 (1993); SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 1, at 28; ALAIN POTTAGE & BRAD
SHERMAN, FIGURES OF INVENTION 4, 7 (2010) (“Intangibility is a figment.”).
94
See EDELMAN, supra note 53, at 40 (“juridical fiction”).
93
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necessary to create the first prototype of a copyrightable work, a
patentable invention, or a distinctive sign capable of use as a
trademark is not what IPRs protect.95 Instead, IPRs attach to the
objective result of an antecedent labor, irrespective of the efforts and
difficulties that work entailed. It is true that this focus on the result
conceives of and thus transforms public and personal knowledge
and intellectual labor into some kind of raw material that is available
in the public domain and/or on labor markets.96 But this
transformation occurs with regard to every work and work product
that is up for sale. It is not a specific feature of IPRs.97 What is more,
IPRs do not apply retroactively to information that was produced or
published before the respective IP law came into effect. They thus
do not change the status of already existing information from being
owned by no one or belonging to the commons in a private domain.98
In addition, basic building blocks of human knowledge systems like
laws of nature, factual information, abstract concepts, scientific
theories, and mathematical concepts always remain beyond the
reach of IPRs.99
There are, however, constellations in which IPRs indeed apply
to works, inventions, signs etc. that were brought about in nonmarket contexts and without the perspective of commercialization.
Grace periods in patent law are precisely meant to allow for such a
transformation. According to U.S. patent law, a disclosure made by
the inventor or joint inventor one year or less before the effective
filing date of a claimed invention, for example, during an academic
congress, is not prior art to the claimed invention and thus does not
95
The only exception is the EU right for database producers, which is rightly called a
“sui generis” right because, in contrast to all other IPRs, it does not attach to a marketable
artefact/product, but to the substantial investments into a non-original database. Cf. Council
Directive 96/9, art. 7-11, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20.
96
See JESSOP, supra note 15, at 117.
97
But see id. at 120 (“knowledge is codified, detached from manual labour, and
disentangled from material products to acquire independent form in expert systems,
intelligent machines, or immaterial products and services.”).
98
See MONIKA KÜPPERS, CHALLENGING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN – PROTECTION OF
TRADITIONAL CULTURAL EXPRESSION IN THE LIGHT OF RETROACTIVE COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION 60 (2017), Goethe University Frankfurt am Main Dissertation 2018.
99
Alexander Peukert, A Doctrine of the Public Domain, in THE INNOVATION AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Josef Drexl ed., forthcoming), https://ssrn.com
/abstract=2713757 [https://perma.cc/7QVN-B437].
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bar later propertization.100 Copyright comes into existence
automatically and therefore covers each and every artifact
displaying a modicum of creativity, including countless works
created for pleasure in completely private settings. If these works
retain their non-commercial social status, their copyright protection
does not attain relevance. Thanks to the Internet, however, works
created in private nowadays often see the light of day and sometimes
even spark great commercial success. Such a move from fan fiction
to best seller in itself reorganizes the communicative context from
non-commercial to commercial.101 More visible and contested
transformations concern academia and the artistic field. These
spheres operate separately from the market on the basis of
autonomous logics of truth and aesthetics and respective allocations
of reputational gains and losses among academics and artists.102 If
genuine academic writings and artworks originally created for their
own sake (“l’art pour l’art”) are later marketed as products up for
sale, their perception and evaluation change fundamentally. They
are not valued anymore according to their truth, depth of thought, or
aesthetic originality but rather according to their market success.
Depending upon its frequency, such commodification can exhibit
systemic effects that tend to supplant an open and reciprocal
“republic of science” and an equally autonomous artistic field with
profit-oriented transactions.103 In the area of trademark law, finally,
ex-post-commodification of non-commercial signs concerns
artworks in the public domain and cultural icons that are later used
100

Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) (2018), with EPC, supra note 68, art. 55(b) (noting
six months grace period for displays of the invention at an international exhibition).
101
Except perhaps in the view of literary critics. See Liz Bury, Fifty Shades of Pay:
Erotica Yarn Sends EL James to Top Spot in Earnings List, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 14,
2013), https://www.theguardian.com/books/2013/aug/14/el-james-highest-earning-author
[https://perma.cc/5C5V-KZNX].
102
For information on Academia, see Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its
Political and Economic Theory, 38 MINERVA 1 (2000); Alexander Peukert, Das Verhältnis
zwischen Urheberrecht und Wissenschaft: Auf die Perspektive kommt es an!, 4 J. INTELL.
PROP. INFO. TECH. ELEC. COMM. 142 para. 1 (2013); ACADEMIC CAPITALISM IN THE AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION (Brendan Cantwell & Ilkka Kauppinen eds., 2014). For information on
Art, see PIERRE BOURDIEU, RULES OF ART: GENESIS AND STRUCTURE OF THE LITERARY
FIELD (Susan Emanuel trans., 1996); Martin Senftleben, Copyright, Creators and Society’s
Need for Autonomous Art – the Blessing and Curse of Monetary Incentives, in WHAT IF
WE COULD REIMAGINE COPYRIGHT? (Rebecca Giblin & Kimberlee Weatherall eds., 2017).
103
See sources cited supra note 102.
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as signs indicating the origin of a good or service.104 The European
Free Trade Association (EFTA) Court recently confirmed that, in
general, trademark protection is available and legitimate in such
cases, unless there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat of
“misappropriation or desecration” of the respective work, in which
case a trademark registration may be refused on the basis of the
public policy/morality exception.105
2. Commodifying Communication
In quantitative terms, these instances of ex-postcommodification do not, however, justify labeling IP as “fictitious”
across the board. Much, if not most, IP subject matter is originally
produced for sale under conditions of the market and thus presents
a real capitalist commodity in Polanyian terms.106 Suffice it to
mention patented medicines and other technologies invented within
private companies for commercial gain, proprietary software,
entertainment products, phonograms, broadcasting signals,
databases and other products protected by rights related to
copyright, industrial designs, and signs created for use as trade
marks. Industrial property law is even confined to the commercial
context. Private uses of patented inventions, protected designs,
trademarks, etc. are beyond the scope of these IPRs.107 Copyright
does extend to the private sphere but often in the weaker form of a
right to remuneration (liability rule).108 Thus, many, if not most,
IPRs institutionalize markets for original commodities.
This statement is, however, premature because it fails to
recognize the peculiar communicative character of all inventions,
works, and signs, irrespective of whether they have been created for
non-commercial or commercial purposes. Communication is

104
See Katya Assaf, The Dilution of Culture and the Law of Trademarks, 49 IDEA 1
(2008); Martin Senftleben, Free Signs and Free Use, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND INTELL. PROP. 354, 357 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015).
105
See EFTA Court Case E-5/16, Municipality of Oslo, para. 102. For U.S. law, see 15
U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2016). See generally Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744 (2017).
106
See Jessop, supra note 15, at 118–19.
107
Cf. PATENTGESETZ [PATG] [GERMAN PATENT ACT], art. 31 § 11(1), Dec. 16, 1980,
BGBL I at 1; Community Design Regulation, 6/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 3) 1, 6 (EU).
108
Cf. Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, art. 5(2)(b), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 1.
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generally defined as a process in which one person imparts
something that she knows to another:
[E]very act of communication requires a sender, a
message, a medium or channel for its transmission,
and a recipient who can decipher or decode it. The
code in which it can be expressed depends on the
type of decoder the recipient uses to receive,
comprehend and assimilate it. Homo sapiens is . . .
a recipient with a wide variety of decoders.109
The creation and further use of inventions, works, and
trademarks always involves such acts of communication. To bring
about a new technical solution, a creative expression, or a distinctive
sign, firstly requires an immense amount of personal knowledge on
the part of a novice innovator that has to be acquired by learning
about existing technologies, works, brands, etc.110 Secondly, and
more importantly, the result of this preparatory act of
communication is itself an artefact that communicates something.
Most notably, texts, but all other categories of copyrightable works
too, express information, be it a scientific theory, a story, or another
visually or aurally perceivable “idea.”111 Immanuel Kant therefore
characterized printed matter as a dynamic speech of the author
(opera) and not as an objective thing (opus).112 The German Federal
Constitutional Court also finds that:
once a work is published[,] it is no longer at its
owner’s sole disposal, but enters the social sphere,
just as it was intended to do, and can thereby become
an independent factor that helps define the cultural
109

See ECJ Case C-273/00, Sieckmann v. Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt, Opinion of
Advocate General Colomer, 2002 E.C.R. I-11737, paras. 19–20.
110
See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) (“advances, once part of
our shared knowledge, define a new threshold from which innovation starts once more”);
see also Laboratory Corp. v. Metabolite, 548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006) (Breyer, J., Stevens, J.,
& Souter, J., dissenting).
111
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 9(2).
112
See IMMANUEL KANT, On the Unlawfulness of Reprinting (1785), reprinted in
PRIMARY
SOURCES
ON
COPYRIGHT
(1450–1900),
http://
www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord.php?id=record_d_1785
[https://perma.cc/982X-SJVR]; ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH
COPYING? 8, 16, 113 (2015).
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and intellectual scene of its era. As over time, the
work is no longer only subject to disposal under
private law and becomes common intellectual and
cultural property, the author must accept that it will
increasingly serve as a link to an artistic dialogue.113
The same can be said of patentable inventions. For inventions
are neither to be equated with a machine or other “dead” artefacts
nor with a “relation between a person and an object.”114 Instead,
inventions teach a person having ordinary skill in the art
(PHOSITA) how to solve a particular problem by making use of
natural resources and the laws of nature.115 In other words, an
invention communicates technical information (the message) from
a sender (the inventor) to a recipient (the PHOSITA). Trademarks,
finally, also “convey a message.”116 It is their very function to
inform the public about the origin of a product and to create an
attractive image.117
Thus, works, inventions, and trademarks are not static
commodities produced for consumption but elements of dynamic
communicative processes. They are derived from the state of the art
and further conveyed to the public, whose members in turn rely on
them as the basis for further innovation, creative expression, and
competition. To treat IP as if it is a marketable good is fictitious
because such commoditization ignores IP’s embeddedness in
communication. What is more, the communicative significance of a
given work, invention, or trademark for the public—and thus its use
and, eventually, its exchange value—is not produced by the IPR
holder. All that an author, inventor, or trademark owner can do is to
113

BVerfG, May 31, 2016, NJW 2016, 2247 para. 87 – Metall auf Metall (English
version:
http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20160531_1bvr158513en.html
[https://perma.cc
/ZR9X-9KRA] (emphasis added).
114
Contra DRASSINOWER, supra note 112, at 64–65.
115
See BGH Mar. 03, 1969, GRUR 1969, 672 (673) – Rote Taube; BGH Jun. 30, 2015,
GRUR 2015, 983 para. 27 - Flugzeugzustand (Erfindung als “Lehre zum planmäßigen
Handeln unter Einsatz beherrschbarer Naturkräfte zur Erreichung eines kausal
übersehbaren Erfolgs”); BGH Sep. 27, 2016, GRUR 2017, 261, para. 21 –
Rezeptortyrosinkinase II (“Lehre zum technischen Handeln”).
116
See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1752 (2017) (“trademarks often consist[ed] of
catchy phrases that convey a message”).
117
See Cohen, supra note 17, at 5–6.

1182

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:1151

impart her artistic, technical, or marketing message to the public and
hope that some recipients will receive, understand, and find interest
in it. Only in this case is the communication complete and a use
value created. A book unread, a technical teaching ignored, or a
trademark not perceived is worth just the paper on which it is
printed. IP only enters the picture if there is an active recipient. The
moment when an IP communication is successfully completed is,
however, not only the moment when exchange value is created but
also the moment in which a work or other IP subject matter becomes
“common intellectual and cultural property.”118 This common
property and sometimes even the meaning of a work or trademark is
created by members of the public.119 It thus cannot be attributed to
the author, inventor, or other IPR holder alone. The contrary rule of
IPR ownership is thus based on a fiction.
3. Commodifying Artefacts and Actions of Non-owners
One could still try to defend IP as a “real” commodity in
Polanyian terms by pointing to IP subject matter that does not
communicate anything. For example, the rights “related” to the
copyright of a phonogram of film producers and of broadcasters do
not attach to a message that a sender imparts to a recipient but to the
medium or channel employed for the transmission of a piece of
information, namely to fixations of sounds and moving images, and
to broadcasting signals.120 If a phonogram, a film carrier, or a

118

See BVerfG, May 31, 2016, NJW 2016, 2247 para. 87 – Metall auf Metall (English
version:
http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20160531_1bvr158513en.html
[https://perma.cc
/ZR9X-9KRA].
119
See Dev S. Gangjee, Property in Brands, LSE LAW, SOC’Y AND ECON. WORKING
PAPERS at 1, 19 (Jun. 13, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2249765 [https://perma.cc/D9F2-NE8E] (regarding the consumer understanding of a
trademark, and unpaid labor of consumers).
120
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 14. Another example of this materialist
approach concerns plant variety rights that attach to a “plant grouping within a single
botanical taxon of the lowest known rank, which grouping, irrespective of whether the
conditions for the grant of a breeder’s right are fully met, can be defined by the expression
of the characteristics resulting from a given genotype or combination of genotypes,
distinguished from any other plant grouping by the expression of at least one of the said
characteristics and considered as a unit with regard to its suitability for being propagated
unchanged.” See International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
(UPOV),
art.
1(vi),
Mar.
19,
1991,
815
U.N.T.S.
89
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broadcasting signal produced for the entertainment market is not a
“real” commodity, what else will qualify for this category? In
addition, both this and other IP subject matter, including works,
inventions, and trademarks, have for a long time been signified and
regulated as “goods” that can be owned and traded on markets.121 Is
this absolutely dominant practice not proof enough of the
ontological adequacy of IP commodification?122
Well, not if one takes into account that mainstream IP theory
itself characterizes IPRs as legal institutions creating “artificial
scarcity” of otherwise “public goods.”123 For to treat public goods
as if they were private commodities and to execute this
transformation by legal means is exactly the kind of fictitiousness
Polanyi had in mind.124
Yet even this observation does not exhaust the problem. The
continued talk about “public” goods that, through a legal measure,
turn into “private” goods neglects and obscures a transformation at
a deeper level, namely the level of how we collectively conceive of
reality and regulate human interaction accordingly. The worldview
I allude to here is the view that IP “goods,” like works, inventions,
https://www.upov.int/upovlex/en/conventions/1991/act1991.html
[https://perma.cc/B86R-6V2Z]; PEUKERT, supra note 35, at 68.
121
This is true even for critical observers. See, e.g., DRAHOS, supra note 67, at 156, 212;
Jessop, supra note 15, at 120 (“non-rival good”). But see Pagano, supra note 85, at 1413
(“Knowledge is not an object defined in a limited physical space. The same item of
knowledge can be encoded in multiple languages, using many different objects existing in
a potentially infinite number of places. For this reason, the full-blown private ownership
of knowledge means a global monopoly that limits the liberty of many individuals in
multiple locations.”).
122
See Maria E. Reicher, Wie aus Gedanken Dinge werden. Eine Philosophie der
Artefakte, 61 DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE 219, 227 (2013); Andrew Chin, The
Ontological Function of the Patent Document, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 263 (2012).
123
See Lemley, supra note 12, at 460 (“In effect, the point of IP laws is to take a public
good that is naturally nonrivalrous and make it artificially scarce, allowing the owner to
control how many copies of the good can be made and at what price.”).
124
See Borghi, supra note 15, at 3–4 (“No law of the market can convert an idea, or a
poem, or a creation, into a scarce item . . . ideas . . . are not naturally commodities, but
they are nonetheless treated as if they were commodities . . . No natural law of the market
(no ‘invisible hand’) is capable of producing this fiction by itself. The fiction must be
established as such.”); Jessop, supra note 15, at 120 (“knowledge is collectively produced
and is not inherently scarce . . . it is made artificially scarce and access thereto depends
on payment of rent”); Pagano, supra note 85, at 1414 (“commons were turned into
exclusive private property”).
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brands. etc., exist as distinct objects and that these “goods” can be
allocated to certain owners in exclusion of all others. The respective
ontology assumes that IP objects exist as abstract objects (types)
independently from their instantiations (tokens) in books, products,
digital files, and other physical or mental manifestations.125
I have shown elsewhere in detail126 that this ontology is
implausible because the existence of allegedly abstract IP is always
dependent upon the existence of at least one physical or mental
“embodiment.” The dominant paradigm is also untenable from a
legal perspective because law can legitimately only regulate
behavior that relates to brute facts that humans are able to control.
Abstract types exactly defy such control. I also show that the idea of
the abstract IP object was the result of a quite recent historical
process, in which signifiers like “the” book, work, or invention
changed their meaning. Instead of referencing many distinct but
sufficiently similar artefacts and actions, they henceforth signified
abstract IP objects. Whereas early modern privileges and still the
first British patent and copyright statutes regulated exclusive rights
to print a book or work a machine, today’s paradigm was only
implemented in full by the French Revolutionary Acts of 1791 and
1793, which granted exclusive property rights in “ouvrages,” “idée
nouvelle,” and “découvertes industrielle.” Since then, we have
treated books, machines, other items with physical existence, and
public performances as secondary “embodiments” of a primary,
abstract “intellectual property.”
The transformation at stake here concerns the dominant
perception of the world. An idealized world of abstract objects
superseded a realistic focus on artefacts and actions having brute,
measurable existence. This fundamental shift occurred solely in our
language and thinking. The brute facts of artefacts and actions
125
See Berne Convention, supra note 68, art. 2(1); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (“embodied”);
CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE art. L111-3 (Fr.) (“La propriété incorporelle
définie par l’article L. 111-1 est indépendante de la propriété de l’objet matériel.”); Michael
J. Madison, The End of the Work As We Know It, 19 U. GEORG. L. J. INTELL. PROP. L. 325,
333 (2012) (“The work subject to copyright is solely and purely an intangible thing.”);
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 15–16, 26(1).
126
See PEUKERT, supra note 35; Paul Duguid, The Aging of Information: From Particular
to Particulate, 76 UC BERKELEY J. HIST. IDEAS 347 (2015) (regarding information as an
object).
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(books, machines, performances) retained their physical existence.
But they were signified and conceived of differently: not as artefacts
and actions whose use or occurrence was regulated, but as
exemplars of an IP object that belonged to someone else. This
bizarre abstraction is fictitious in the sense that we speak of works,
inventions, and other IP objects as of tangible commodities, where
in fact IP objects only exist insofar and because we speak and
regulate as if they exist as abstract “things” of value. In other words,
IP objects only exist in our linguistic practice and collective
imagination.127 From a legal realist perspective, IPRs are exclusive
rights to prevent or authorize the reproduction and further use of
certain Master Artefacts.128 And the only reason for the “wild”129
conceptual move from privileges to act to modern IPRs in abstract
objects was the commodity function of IP. The emerging market for
books and other innovative yet easily reproducible products required
property rights in distinct abstract objects that represented the input
of authors and inventors.130
C. Consequences: Dis-embedding Effects of IP
The market demand for commodification of each and every
element of production was also the driver for the fictitious
commodification of labor, land, and money, the commodities
studied by Polanyi. In his opinion, their transformation into
commodities produced devastating effects:
To allow the market mechanism to be sole director
of the fate of human beings and their natural
environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of
purchasing power, would result in the demolition of
society. For the alleged commodity ‘labor power’
cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or
127

Richard Rudner, The Ontological Status of the Esthetic Object, 10 PHIL. AND
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 380 (1950).
128
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 11, 16, 26, 28 (Members shall provide right
holders with exclusive rights to “prevent,” “prohibit” or “authorize” certain conduct);
Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, Intellectual Property and the Efficient Allocation of
Social Surplus from Creation, 2 REV. OF ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 45 (2005).
129
See Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 4 Burr. 2303, 2357 (Yates, J., dissenting); see also
SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 1, at 19.
130
See Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 4 Burr. 2303, 2357 (Yates, J., dissenting).
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even left unused, without affecting also the human
individual who happens to be the bearer of this
peculiar commodity. In disposing of a man’s labor
power the system would, incidentally, dispose of the
physical, psychological, and moral entity ‘man’
attached to that tag. Robbed of the protective
covering of cultural institutions, human beings
would perish from the effects of social exposure;
they would die as the victims of acute social
dislocation through vice, perversion, crime, and
starvation. Nature would be reduced to its elements,
neighborhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers
polluted, military safety jeopardized, the power to
produce food and raw materials destroyed. Finally,
the market administration of purchasing power
would periodically liquidate business enterprise, for
shortages and surfeits of money would prove as
disastrous to business as floods and droughts in
primitive society. Undoubtedly, labor, land, and
money markets are essential to a market economy.
But no society could stand the effects of such a
system of crude fictions even for the shortest stretch
of time unless its human and natural substance as
well as its business organization was protected
against the ravages of this satanic mill.131
At first sight, the transformation of reproducible artefacts and
their communicative use to abstract IP objects give less cause for
such dramatic warnings. In and of itself, the formation and
expansion of the IP system can hardly be blamed for consequences
of the magnitude Polanyi describes.132 His analysis is nevertheless
informative for our purposes because IP exhibits the same dis-

131

See POLANYI, supra note 7, at 76–77.
James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47
DUKE L.J. 87, 115 (1997) (“After all, environmental problems could actually destroy the
biosphere and this is just, well, intellectual property.”). But see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE:
VERSION 2.0, at xv (2d ed. 2006); JOHN NAUGHTON, FROM GUTENBERG TO ZUCKERBERG
291 (2012); EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION (2011) (Orwell-Huxley scenario
where global IP champions form a powerful alliance with state actors).
132
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embedding ramifications that characterize other fictitious
commodities.133 What they effectuate is that, “[i]nstead of economy
being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in
the economic system.”134
The dis-embedding impact of IP can be explicated with
reference to the three features of its fictitiousness introduced above,
namely its application to information that was not produced for sale,
the commodification of communicative practices, and, more
generally, the fictitious treatment of the use of artefacts by nonowners “remote from the persons or tangibles of the party having
the right”135 as infringements of a property right in an abstract IP
object.
Ex post commodification of artefacts originally created in noncommercial contexts, such as religion or academia, transplants the
works or signs into a market setting. Thereby, the respective
artefacts are dis-embedded from their social roots and integrated
into an economic order governed by a logic of profitable/nonprofitable. With every expansion of the market, the fields where
non-market logics of true/false (academia), sacred/profane
(religion), aesthetic/non-aesthetic (arts), or winning/losing (sports)
dominate will shrink, and this will attenuate the norms that stabilize
these fields.136 Whereas some commentators praise this type of
commodification as the creation of secondary economic meaning,
others conceive of it as a corruptive force that supplants traditional
lifeworlds.137
133

See Boyle, supra note 132, at 115.
See POLANYI, supra note 7, at 60.
135
White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes, J.,
concurring); Pagano, supra note 85, at 1414 (2014) (“the holders of property rights on
knowledge . . . can decide whether a certain production process can be undertaken in a
particular country”).
136
See Jessop, supra note 15, at 120.
137
Compare Megan Richardson, Trade Marks and Language, 26 SYDNEY L. REV. 193,
213 (2004), with MADHAVI SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE. INTELL. PROP. AND
GLOBAL JUSTICE 2, 5 (2012) (IP “bears fundamentally on the basic activities that make for
a full and joyful life” in a culture that is not understood as an accumulation of goods but as
a “process of creative and social interaction”). On the transformation of football clubs from
sports associations to entertainment companies and the role of trademark law in this
transformation, see ECJ Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club v. Matthew Reed, Opinion
of Advocate General Colomer, 2002 E.C.R. I-10273, para 79.
134
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The more general insight that patents, copyrights, and
trademarks split up dynamic, interconnected processes of
communication into separate pieces of information that may be
imparted, received, and further used only upon prior authorization
by the right holder points to a generally disruptive potential of IPRs
for society at large. Communication, as defined above, is
doubtlessly a central, if not the specific, feature of human
societies.138 The more information that is covered by IPRs, the less
communication of technical teachings, expressions of various sorts,
and brand images can occur spontaneously and without regard to
exclusive rights of others. Taken to the extreme, the interruptions
caused by IPRs would bring communication and, thus, societal
exchange effectively to a halt or reconfigure today’s society to a
nightmarish system where only those are allowed to speak and act
are those who can afford it.139 Unfortunately, one can observe
instances where this risk flashes up. Patent and other IPR thickets
stifle economic competition (which is part of, and embedded in,
society);140 digital copyright law remodels heterarchical networks
where everyone can speak publicly (e.g. user-generated content
platforms) into closed, hierarchically structured, and fully licensed
services;141 and contemporary trademark law reinforces
consumption as the primary meaning of life.142
The third and final aspect of the fictitiousness of IP, namely the
fiction
of
the
abstract
IP
object,
ignores
the
innovative/entrepreneurial process leading to IP as well as
imitative/repetitive activity and follow-on innovation, which IP law
138

See LUHMANN, supra note 37, at 80.
See SUNDER, supra note 137, at 5 (regarding the continuity of societal and cultural
exchange as an end in itself).
140
See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP
WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2010); Barton Beebe & Jeanne
C. Fromer, Are We Running out of Trademarks? An Empirical Study of Trademark
Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945 (2018). Regarding the financial system,
cf. Wolfgang Streeck, How Will Capitalism End?, 87 NEW LEFT REV. 35, 51 (2014)
(“excessive commodification of money. . . brought down the global economy in 2008”).
141
See Alexander Peukert, Copyright and the Two Cultures of Online Comm., in INTELL.
PROP. L. AND HUMAN RIGHTS 367 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 3rd ed. 2015); Parliament and
Council Directive 2019/790, art. 17, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92.
142
See POLANYI, supra note 7, at 157 (“cultural void”); RICHARDSON, supra note 137, at
215–16. See generally ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, CONSUMING LIFE (2007).
139
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treats as either illegal or exceptionally lawful for reasons that again
lie beyond IP law, e.g. the freedom of information and competition.
This willful disregard of the reality that IPRs regulate (i.e. the
production, reproduction, and further use of artefacts remote from
the right holder) fosters abstract talk about fictitious objects and
problems, e.g. a systematic lack of incentive to innovate or invest in
ever larger segments of the market economy. At the same time, the
dominant paradigm obscures the aforementioned disruptive
potential of IPRs within and beyond the economy. It falsely suggests
that IPRs allocate objects just like other exclusive property rights,
whereas, in fact, IPRs are exclusive privileges to act in certain ways
with regard to certain artefacts.143
III. COUNTERMOVEMENTS: FROM OBJECTS TO ARTEFACTS AND
ACTIONS
The fiction that IPRs apply to objects that are ready for
commodification, like land and other tangibles, furthermore
obfuscates the fact that IPRs not only form the basis of “free”
markets but also possess a strong protectionist element in that they
allow IPR holders and their respective home countries to leverage
market power. This feature explains why the acceptance and
expansion of IPRs gained momentum at the very moment the free
trade era, which had brought about the fictitious commodification of
labor, land, and money, came to an end in the 1870s.144 Historically
and functionally, IPRs are thus located at the transition from early
19th century commodification and laissez-faire capitalism to late
19th century countermovements.
It would, however, be a mistake to qualify IPRs as a
countermovement
measure
in
Polanyian
terms.
The
countermovements Polanyi studies are self-protective measures of
society at large against the destructive effects of the fictitious
commodification of labor and land. Their purpose is to re-embed
143

See PEUKERT, supra note 35.
Compare POLANYI, supra note 7, at 19 (“by the end of the seventies the free trade
episode (1846–79) was at an end”) and DALE, supra note 10, at 86 (discussing German
tariff politics in the 1870s), with SECKELMANN, supra note 2, at 155, 169–170, 415
(discussing the formation of international patent law in the 1870s and 1880s).
144
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these commodities and the respective markets into society and the
environment, with the ultimate aim to guarantee the continued
existence of man and nature. These policies were implemented by
labor, social security, and early environmental protection laws.145 IP
laws differ from these regulations both teleologically and
structurally. Their primary aim is not to control market forces but to
integrate innovative and entrepreneurial activity into the market
system. To this end, they grant individual owners private rights in
fictitious goods.146 The effect of this measure is exactly the opposite
of Polanyi’s countermovements, namely the separation of ever
larger segments of technical, artistic, and other communication from
the rest of society.
Accordingly, analogies to Polanyi’s countermovements in the
area of IP are to be found beyond IPRs. Respective norms are
characterized by the purpose of re-embedding IP subject matter into
commercial and non-commercial societal exchange that occurs
spontaneously and irrespective of prior authorization
requirements.147 Rules with this aim are scattered across various
legal fields, ranging from contract and competition law to
fundamental rights. In contrast to social security/labor and
environmental protection laws, they still lack a coherent legal and
theoretical basis. The most aspirational proposal along these lines,
and, unsurprisingly also the one most closely tied to Polanyi’s
theory, is James Boyle’s call for a “cultural environmentalism.”148
A. The Contested Boundaries of IPRs
Commodification and countermovements clash at the
boundaries of IPRs. The limits of exclusivity demarcate the realm
of IP markets on the one hand and the realm of spontaneous societal
communication and exchange based on everyone’s equal negative
liberty to copy and otherwise use reproducible artefacts on the other.

145

See POLANYI, supra note 7, at 171.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, at preamble.
147
On the integration of the TRIPS Agreement into general international law, see
HENNING GROSSE RUSE-KHAN, THE PROTECTION OF INTELL. PROP. IN INT’L L. ch. 12–13
(2016).
148
See Boyle, supra note 132; Boyle, supra note 16, at 53, 69; ROBERT CUNNINGHAM,
INFORMATION ENVIRONMENTALISM (2014).
146
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The expansion of one system necessarily reduces the scope of the
other. Thus, advances to push the boundaries in any direction are
always fights over all or nothing. Since IPRs are “creatures of
statute,”149 respective debates primarily take place in the political
and legislative sphere.150 The conflict between the forces of
commodification and opposing movements resurfaces when the
boundaries of IP laws and rights are contested before courts and
other tribunals. On both the macro and the micro level, continuous
efforts are undertaken to sustain unauthorized communication and
competition or even to re-embed commodified information into
spontaneous societal exchange. These countermovements can again
be classified according to the three aspects of the fictitiousness of
IP.151
The resistance against the commodification of reproducible
artefacts that are not primarily produced for sale but first and
foremost for other purposes (IP fiction No. 1) is mostly brought up
as an issue of public interest, policy, or morality. In this regard,
international and EU IP law grant nation states a wide range of
discretion so as to enable them to integrate the global innovation and
brand markets into a local society that avoids serious prejudice to
the environment and provides protection for all life forms and public
health.152 As a consequence, inventions remain unpatentable in the
EU that require the prior destruction of human embryos or their use
as base material.153 Trademark registrations can be denied on the
ground that a sign is contrary to public policy or accepted principles

149
See Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, para. 25
(Can.); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 662–63 (1834) (“This right . . .does not exist at
common law—it originated, if at all, under the acts of congress.”); BVerfG Jul. 15, 1981,
58 BVerfGE 300 (330) - Naßauskiesung (“The legislature creates on the level of objective
laws those provisions which establish the legal position of the owner”).
150
See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
151
Supra Section II.B.
152
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 8(1), 27(2); World Trade Organization,
Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M.
755 (2002) (“We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent
members from taking measures to protect public health.”); CJEU Case C-34/10, Brüstle v.
Greenpeace, 2011 E.C.R. I-9821, para. 29.
153
See CJEU Case C-34/10, Brüstle v. Greenpeace, 2011 E.C.R. I-9821, para. 49.
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of morality,154 and the international copyright system does not in
any way affect a government’s right to censor copyright-protected
speech for reasons of the local public order.155 Numerous copyright
statutes and doctrines serve to protect academia and the artistic field
from being completely transformed into segments of the market
where the ability to participate in academic or artistic exchange
would depend solely on one’s ability to buy and sell. In this regard,
reference can be made to the universal public domain status of
factual information, scientific theories, mathematical concepts, and
artistic styles156; further limitations and exceptions for purposes of
research and education;157; and the case law of the German Federal
Constitutional Court calling for an “art-specific” interpretation of
copyright that would allow for “an artistic dialogue with existing
works, without being subject to financial risks or restrictions in
terms of content.”158
Numerous further limitations and exceptions aim at cabining IP
fiction No. 2, namely the splitting up of technical, artistic, academic,
and commercial communication into single commodified objects.
To avoid the permanent disruption and potential breakdown of
communication and competition because of IP-related authorization
requirements, the law exempts acts done privately and for noncommercial purposes from the scope of IPRs either completely or
154

See Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, art. 7(1)(f), 2017 O.J. (L 154) 1,
[hereinafter EUTMReg 2017/1001]; EUTMDir 2015/2436, supra note 6, art. 4(1)(f), 2015
O.J. (L 336) 1, 7; EFTA Court Case E-5/16, Municipality of Oslo; 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a);
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 6, March 20, 1883, 25 Stat.
1372; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 15(2); Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744 (2017).
155
See Berne Convention, supra note 68, art. 17; Panel Report, China – Measures
Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intell. Prop. Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26,
2009), paras. 7.120-7.139.
156
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 9(2).
157
See
also
WIPO,
Limitations
and
Exceptions,
http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/limitations [https://perma.cc/9CFX-4EEY] (regarding
copyright limitations and exceptions amongst various countries); cf. Kenneth D. Crews,
Study on Copyright Limitations and Exceptions for Libraries and Archives, WIPO (Nov.
2,
2017),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_35/sccr_35_6.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3KA4-D52B].
158
Cf. BVerfG May 31, 2016, 142 BVerfGE 74, paras. 86–87 – Sampling (English
version
available
at:
http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20160531_1bvr158513en.html
[https://perma.cc/4TRV-S42A]). For a similar result based on a general de minimis
limitation of copyright, see VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016).
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subjects them only to a levy.159 IP laws furthermore declare
admissible acts done for experimental purposes,160 quotations,161
hyperlinks to works freely available on another website,162 and
comparative advertising and other referential uses of protected
trademarks, if such commercial communication is otherwise in
accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial
matters.163
Fiction No. 3, the abstract IP object, is the most fundamental
one. It treats certain activities, namely the employment of third
parties’ own reproduction technologies (think of your computer) and
their cognitive capacities, as if these activities, which occur
remotely from the IPR holder, constitute trespass upon a private
property owned by that person. Countermovements taking aim at
this basic fiction defend the general freedom to copy/imitate and to
use/perform copies/imitations, even if highly innovative
technologies, creative expression, and distinctive trademarks are
concerned.164 Legal measures to this end are less thematically
focused than rules that protect information from ex post
commodification and instruments preventing or softening
159

Cf. Community Design Regulation 6/2002, art. 20(1)(a), 2002 O.J. (L 3) 2, 7 (EU);
GERMAN PATENT ACT § 11 No. 1; Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, art. 5(2)(b),
2001 O.J. (L 167) 1. But see, as a counter-move of the forces of commodification,
Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, art. 6(4), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 1 (stating DRM
systems trump digital private copy exemption).
160
Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (Story, J.: “it could
never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who constructed such a
machine merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the
sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects.”); Madey v. Duke Univ., 307
F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002); GERMAN PATENT ACT § 11 No. 2, 2a, 2b; Community
Design Regulation 6/2002, art. 20(1)(b), 2002 O.J. (L 3) 2, 7 (EU).
161
See Berne Convention, supra note 68, art. 10(1).
162
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007); CJEU
Case C-160/15, GS Media v. Sanoma, ECLI:EU:C:2016:644, paras. 40–41.
163
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
23:11 (5th ed. 2017); Parliament and Council Directive 2006/114, art. 4, O.J. (L 376) 21,
23; EUTMDir 2015/2436, supra note 6, art. 14; EUTMReg 2017/1001, supra note 154,
art. 12. Regarding the limits of these countermovements, see ECJ Case C-206/01, Arsenal
Football Club v. Matthew Reed, 2002 E.C.R. I-10273, para. 51; ECJ Case C-487/07
L’Oréal v. Bellure, 2009 E.C.R. I-5185.
164
EFTA Court Case E-5/16, Municipality of Oslo, para. 65 (“The considerations
relating to the public domain also serve, to some extent, the general interest in protecting
creations of the mind from commercial greed . . . and in ensuring the freedom of the arts.”).
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disruptions of communication caused by IPRs. Opposition against
IP fiction No. 3 is also of a more radical kind because it questions
the very object status of IP and stresses the liberty-inhibiting effects
of IPRs. Boundaries of IPRs that reflect these kind of
countermovements include:
 the territoriality principle, which secures that
States can adjust the level of IP protection to their
local socio-economic conditions165;
 the first-sale doctrine/exhaustion principle,
which allows for the free circulation of tangible
exemplars that were put on the market with the
consent of the IPR holder166;
 the freedom of transit of goods and, more
generally, the principle of free trade in goods and
services under WTO law167;
 the time limitation of all IPRs in innovation168;
 and the requirement of continuous genuine use of
a trademark, which confirms the embeddedness
of this particular right “in the system of
undistorted competition.”169
Last but not least, countermovements against IP fiction No. 3 are
also voiced in the Grundnorm of the IP system, which is not
ownership as in real property but non-ownership. As long as and
insofar as there are no applicable IPRs in the books, equal negative

165

See Alexander Peukert, Territoriality and Extraterritoriality in Intellectual Property
Law, in BEYOND TERRITORIALITY: TRANSNAT’L LEGAL AUTHORITY IN AN AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION 189–228 (Günther Handl et al. eds., Queen Mary Studies in Int’l L. No.
11, 2012).
166
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 6; Impression Prod., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l,
Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519 (2013).
167
See GROSSE RUSE-KHAN, supra note 147, ch. 10; but see EUTMDir 2015/2436, supra
note 6, art. 10(4); EUTMReg 2017/1001, supra note 154, art. 9(4) (transit as trademark
infringement).
168
See PEUKERT, supra note 35.
169
CJEU Case C-689/15, W.F. Gözze Frottierweberei v. Verein Bremer Baumwollbörse,
ECLI:EU:C:2017:434, para. 37; ECJ Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club v. Matthew
Reed, 2002 E.C.R. I-10273, para. 48; 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(2) (2002) (discussing
abandonment of mark).
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liberty to copy and imitate artefacts reigns.170 Accordingly,
prospective IPR holders face an uphill battle if they want to establish
or expand a privileged position vis-à-vis the world. They carry the
burden of proof that an IPR is warranted.171
B. Commons Regimes
The fiction of the abstract IP object has become, however, so
self-evident and powerful that it has forced all countermovements
onto the defensive. Nowadays, it is often the public domain that
needs justification in political battles and in court, not its limitation
through new or expanded IPRs.172 Much more often than not have
expansionist efforts been successful.173
When commodification continued and even accelerated in the
digital age, civil society initiatives tried to counter and even reverse
this trend. The paradigmatic example in this regard is the Free and
Open Source Software (FOSS) movement, which inspired similar
initiatives in other creative sectors (Creative Commons) and in
academia (Open Access).174 All of these movements strive to realize
the emancipatory potential of the digital, near-zero-marginal-cost
170

EFTA Court Case E-5/16, Municipality of Oslo, para. 66 (stating that “protection is
the exception to the rule that creative content becomes part of the public domain once
communicated”).
171
See Peukert, supra note 99, at para. 43.
172
See, e.g., Mireille van Eechoud et al., Statement from EU Academics on Proposed
Press Publishers’ Right, INST. FOR INFO. L., UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM (Apr. 24, 2018),
https://www.ivir.nl/academics-against-press-publishers-right/
[https://perma.cc/67JR2CLS]; CJEU Case C-527/15, Stichting Brein v. Wullems, ECLI:EU:C:2017:300, para. 62
with further references (limitations to copyright “must be interpreted strictly”).
173
See William Cornish, The Expansion of Intellectual Property Rights, in GEISTIGES
EIGENTUM IM DIENSTE DER INNOVATION 9 (Gerhard Schricker et al. eds., 2001). For a rare
example of a successful countermovement, see LEE, supra note 5; Gracz, supra note 34, at
267.
174
See RICHARD M. STALLMAN, FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY (3d ed. 2015); YOCHIA
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006); Yochia Benkler, Law, Innovation, and
Collaboration in Networked Economy and Society, 13 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 231 (2017);
UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS (Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds.,
2007); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Cultural Environmentalism and Constructed
Commons, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23 (2007); Cohen, supra note 17, at 14.; GOVERNING
KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 86 (Brett M. Frischmann et al. eds., 2014); ERIC V. HIPPEL, FREE
INNOVATION (2017). On the significance of commons production in the area of brands and
consumption, see Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123
HARV. L. REV 809, 884–88 (2010).
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age by establishing networks of commons-based peer production.
Production in these networks does not follow the logic of the market,
where all input and output is separately exchanged for money.
Instead, authors of software, music, and academic writings—the
very beneficiaries of IPRs—allow unspecified others to access and
use their works. This generosity is sometimes coupled with a
requirement of reciprocity, called “copyleft.” According to this rule,
she who uses free or open content is obliged to make her additions
and modifications available to everyone under the same free/open
conditions that she has benefited from. In this case, copyright is not
simply waived or granted royalty-free but actively used as a tool to
turn exclusivity into inclusivity. Copyleft licenses are meant to
expand the realm of non-market communication and innovation and
shield the intellectual commons from the infiltration of proprietary
content and the market mode of exchange. In support of this
alternative mode of communication, the German legislature has
exempted open-content licenses from author-protective rules that
address market-related risks of exploitation, and it has furthermore
preserved the right of publicly funded academic authors to make
journal articles available on Open Access repositories, even if they
have already granted commercial publishers an exclusive license for
the complete copyright term.175
The quantitative and qualitative significance and sustainability
of commons-based production is, however, not beyond doubt.176
Formal, open-content licenses are rarely enforced in court and
involve major, if not insurmountable, legal obstacles, for example,
if the license model that governs a massive project like Wikipedia is
to be amended or replaced.177 It thus seems that open-content

175
Cf. German Copyright Act §§ 31a, 32, 32a, 32c (regarding the grant of an
unremunerated non-exclusive exploitation right for every person); German Copyright Act,
§ 38(4); Dutch Copyright Act, Sept. 23, 1912, Sec. 25fa. See generally Dirk Visser, The
Open Access provision in Dutch Copyright Contract Law, 6 GRUR INT. 534 (2015).
176
See Jonathan M. Barnett, The Illusion of the Commons, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1751,
1814 (2010) (“illusion of the commons”); Primavera De Filippi & Miguel Said Viera,
supra note 13.
177
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MODELS (Axel Metzger ed., 2016); Dan Wielsch, Governance of Massive Multiauthor
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licenses are primarily of symbolic bearing in that they signal legality
in extremely fluid and anonymous communication contexts.
Ultimately, a dynamic sharing culture cannot be founded on the
basis of the classic, bilateral contract that legalizes market
transactions.178
In addition, there are countless texts, images, films, etc.
available on the Internet, the copyright status of which is not
clarified or is, at best, signalled with a ©. This content is
spontaneously accessed and shared, in particular via hyperlinks,
without regard to the authorization requirement that copyright
establishes. In order to bring this societal practice in line with digital
copyright or, in Polanyian terms, in order to embed copyright into
digital society, courts have resorted to the doctrine of implied
consent. In light of the “public interest in the well-functioning of the
Internet,” the German Federal Court of Justice has held that a rightholder who makes texts or images available on the Internet without
access or copy controls implicitly consents to the “normal uses
according to the circumstances.” In other words, she who
voluntarily participates in an unrestricted mode of communication
is thereby subject to the fundamental rules allowing for this nonmarket mode of exchange to occur.179 Contrary to predominantly
critical comments in the literature, the court deserves due respect for
this courageous legal innovation. With the doctrine of implied
consent, it legalizes social norms by a legal measure, which is
adequately informal, flexible, and globally effective—just like the
communication to which it applies.180
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CONCLUSION
This article offers an explanation for the striking dynamic of the
IP system, which is at the same time expanding rapidly and severely
contested. To this end, it makes use of theoretical concepts Karl
Polanyi set out in his ground-breaking study, “The Great
Transformation.” As has been elaborated in Parts I-III supra, the
history of IP can be told in terms of Polanyi’s famous “double
movement.” Efforts to commodify virtually every reproducible
input/output face equally persistent opposition that points out the
disruption IPRs inflict upon communication and competition.
Whereas IPRs dis-embed informational artefacts from the
uninterrupted flow of societal exchange and subject them to prior
authorization requirements, IP countermovements call for their reembedding, i.e. their usability irrespective of authorization. At the
heart of the struggle between market and society lies the ontological
question of how to understand the subject matter of IPRs.
Proponents of commodification assume that IP presents an object,
which in principle lends itself to propertization like land and other
goods, whereas their opponents perceive IP as an integral part of
communication and thus society. According to the latter view, IP
falls into Polanyi’s category of fictitious commodities. I agree with
this qualification because IPRs, in part, attach to information that
was not produced for sale; they partition communication into
commodified pieces, and they are grounded on the obscure fiction
of the abstract IP object.181
A Polanyian perspective on IP teaches further lessons. One
implication concerns IP theory. Whereas there is considerable
theory on IPRs and a well-established layman’s understanding of
these rights, countermovements and their traces in the law have long
been neglected.182 No comprehensive branch of law exists
comparable to labor or environmental laws that systematically
addresses the interests represented by the public domain and by
commons regimes. Rules and provisions on point are scattered
across IP statutes, competition law, and other laws. There is no
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generally accepted theory on what characterizes the public domain
and the intellectual commons and how the two phenomena relate to
each other.183 Although this is not the place to enter into this debate,
a Polanyian perspective can also inform this theoretical debate. For
if IPRs execute the forces of commodification, they cannot at the
same time implement the opposite.184 The notion of “user rights”
equally misses the point that private rights legalize and enforce
individual, not public, interests.185 Instead, an adequate legal theory
of IP countermovements has to explicate that certain reproducible
artefacts belong to everyone (communitarian approach) or that no
one can claim ownership (libertarian approach).186
The last-mentioned alternative finally points to normative
implications of a Polanyian theory of IP. In the final section of the
“Great Transformation,” Polanyi muses about a complex,
industrialized society, in which labor, land, and money are removed
from the market and subjected to central planning, but, at the same
time, the rights of the individual are strengthened and thus freedom
increased. He pins his hopes on a kind of “third way” that avoids the
pitfalls of both 19th century liberalism and oppressive
fascism/socialism.187
The repeated failure of socialist regimes in terms of both
economic efficiency and individual freedom exposes these hopes,
however, as utopian and even dangerous. The society that arguably
came closest to Polanyi’s ideal has been the post-WWII Welfare
State that adhered to the commodification of labor and land but
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greatly intensified distributional interventions in the market by the
state.188
Regarding contemporary IP policy, these normative findings
suggest that extreme versions of either commodification or
countermovements are to be avoided because over-commodification
would disrupt and potentially bring to an end spontaneous
communication, competition, and innovation,189 whereas repealing
IPRs altogether would deny personal competence and threaten
individual liberty and market-based efficiency.190 Instead, IP law
and policy should ensure that market-based transactions coexist with
non-market modes of accessing and sharing information so that
authors, inventors, and other entrepreneurs have as many options as
possible at hand, and all members of society possess adequate
possibilities to acquire knowledge.191 The principle of coexistence
of property and non-ownership/commons regimes implies that
neither alternative may be allowed to oust the other. By
implementing a permanent coexistence of the two, the law would
properly reflect upon the peculiar nature of the subject matter of IP,
which concerns not distinct property objects but the copying and
further use of reproducible artefacts. Whether and to what extent
respective exclusive rights to act are warranted will remain a
controversial political issue, and rightly so.192

188

See

WOLFGANG

STREECK,

GEKAUFTE ZEIT: DIE VERTAGTE KRISE DES
(2d ed. 2016).
189
Compare PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 10 (rev. ed. 2003) and Joseph Straus & Nina-Sophie Klunker,
Harmonisierung des internationalen Patentrechts, 2007 GRUR INT’L 91 (2007) with Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 363–
64 (1996); MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELL. MONOPOLY (2008);
JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2009); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND
COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY (2008).
190
Compare MASON, supra note 12, at 263 with the sources cited supra note 19 and
generally JARON LANIER, YOU ARE NOT A GADGET: A MANIFESTO (2010).
191
Peukert, supra note 141, at para. 43. On the co-existence of capitalism and commons,
see PETER BARNES, CAPITALISM 3.0: A GUIDE TO RECLAIMING THE COMMONS, at xiv (2006);
RIFKIN, supra note 12, at 232.
192
See Alexander Peukert, The Fundamental Right to (Intellectual) Property and the
Discretion of the Legislature, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015).
DEMOKRATISCHEN KAPITALISMUS 76–87

